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Abstract

The goal of this research is to suggest a framework for developing measures of
success for corporate level Air Force acquisition initiatives. Because this research is
exploratory, it focuses on only one initiative: the 2002 Lighting Bolt initiative “Focus on
results, not process.” A qualitative method approach was used to suggest a four part
framework. Through the review of literature, common steps for creating metrics were
established and recurrent characteristics of good metrics were identified. Then interviews
were conducted with acquisition practitioners who have experience with the initiative.
Finally, those three parts were applied to the initiative as a case study and metrics
suggested as a result.
This study gives Air Force leaders clear, implementable metrics that can be used
as measures of success for the initiative, and provides recommendations to improve this
initiative’s performance and that of future corporate Air Force acquisition initiatives.
This study also gives leaders insight into whether or not this initiative and others like it
are an appropriate and effective way to drive the changes they are meant to bring about.
Finally, from a broader perspective, the framework used in this study can be used to
develop metrics for other corporate level initiatives.
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DEVELOPMENT OF MEASURES OF SUCCESS
FOR CORPORATE LEVEL AIR FORCE ACQUISITION INITIATIVES

I. Research Foundation

Background
Almost since its inception in 1947, the Air Force has sought to reform the way it
procures weapon systems. Many factors involved in the weapon system acquisition
process are external to the Air Force and out of its control (i.e., Congressional constraints,
the pace of technology development, weapon system requirements constantly changing as
real world needs dictate). However, self-imposed administrative hurdles are an internal
factor that the Air Force can change in order to help improve its procurement practices.
To target the elements of the acquisition process within the Air Force’s control,
the Air Force began implementing a series of acquisition reform initiatives in 1995.
These initiatives, referred to as “Lightning Bolts,” were created in direct response to Air
Force leadership’s growing concerns that it takes too long to put weapon systems in the
hands of the warfighters (Department of the Air Force, 4 February 2003; Department of
the Air Force, 1:10 July 2003). Collectively, their purpose is to serve as the catalyst by
which administrative changes are made in Air Force business practices (Senate Armed
Services Committee, 2002). However, little is known about how to gauge the success of
these initiatives. Many metrics have been suggested for gauging the success of
acquisition reform attempts within the Department of Defense (DoD), but most of the

1

metrics remain slated for use only in individual acquisition program offices (Pope,
1997:75-77). No list of standard metrics exists, and there are no generally applicable and
logical methods to measure the performance of acquisition reform initiatives today
(Beamon, 1999; Pope, 1997:75-77). Accordingly, this project is designed to help better
understand these initiatives and how to establish acquisition based measures of success.
Gaining a better understanding of the aspects of metric development, and
identifying the recurrence of those aspects among multiple authors, will enable this
research to create a model upon which acquisition based metrics can be built. That model
will then be applied to the 2002 acquisition Lightning Bolt initiative “Focus on results,
not process” as a case study.

Problem Statement
Senior Air Force leaders need to know how well the Lightning Bolt 2002
initiatives are achieving their intended objectives. This research will develop the means
to measure how successfully the Lightning Bolt initiative “Focus on results, not process”
is achieving its objectives. As a result, this research will create a model for developing
measures of success that can be applied to larger, corporate level Air Force acquisition
initiatives.

Methodology
This research uses a qualitative research method approach. Qualitative data will
be collected and analyzed initially, followed by an independent evaluation of the
findings. The qualitative research will use a case study to develop measures of success
for the initiative of interest, and evaluate the effectiveness of that initiative in the
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conclusions and recommendations stage. As part of future research, quantitative data can
help reinforce and confirm the qualitative results.

Outline
Chapter two (Literature Review) provides a history of the Lightning Bolt 2002
acquisition initiatives, and explains why metrics are important to use and their
composition. It also provides a description of the general steps to creating metrics and
the characteristics that good metrics have. It then discusses how metrics are applicable to
acquisition reform initiatives.
Chapter three (Methodology) describes the methodology for the study, including
the interview process used for data collection, the spiral method that will be used to
analyze the data, the techniques used to validate the analysis, and the methods used to
identify a generalized three step process for creating metrics and the core attributes of
good metrics.
Chapter four (Data Analysis) provides an analysis of interview data collected and
an explanation of the resulting themes that evolved. Those results are then tailored to the
“Focus on results, not process” acquisition initiative.
Chapter five (Conclusions and Recommendations) summarizes the research
findings, discusses data collected during interviews and the conclusions reached from that
data, and provides implementable recommendations. The chapter also suggests areas for
future research and study.
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Impact of Study
This study will give Air Force leaders clear, implementable metrics that can be
used as measures of success for the Lightning Bolt initiative of interest. This study will
also give Air Force leaders insight into whether or not this initiative is an effective and
appropriate way to drive the changes it was meant to bring about. In a broader
application, the framework used in this study can be used to develop metrics for other
acquisition based corporate Air Force level initiatives.
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II. Literature Review

This chapter provides the foundation upon which metrics to assess the Lightning
Bolt 2002 initiative “Focus on results, not process” can be developed. In turn, the
research results and metrics can be generalized for any large acquisition based initiative
and thus fulfill the corporate purpose of the research. First, this chapter describes the
background and purpose of the specific initiative being examined along with five others
that have been developed to facilitate the United States Air Force acquisition
community’s improvement and transformation efforts. Next, the chapter reviews the
importance of metrics and what metrics are; general steps involved in developing metrics;
attributes of good metrics; and how metrics can be applied to acquisition reform
initiatives. It is through this review that commonalities among theories of metric
development will be used to build a collection of attributes found to be recurrent among
good metrics. Then, a list of metrics, generated through a series of interviews, will be
assessed against the characteristics of good metrics to construct a set of useable metrics
for the Lightning Bolt 2002 initiative entitled “Focus on results, not process.”

Acquisition Lightning Bolt 2002 Initiatives
On 27 February 2002, in an update to the Senate Armed Services Committee
(2002:¶11) on the Air Force’s on-going acquisition reform efforts and progress, the
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Dr. Marvin Sambur, reaffirmed the
goal set for the Air Force by the President and the Secretary of Defense to transform the
military and improve how it does business. He stated that the Air Force must reduce the
cycle times for moving new technology from the laboratory to the battlefield. At the
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same time, he said that the acquisition community must improve their ability to estimate
both costs and schedules and greatly reduce the number of program surprises that
undermine confidence in our programs and disrupt our progress. Acquisition
practitioners must increase their delivery speed and regain credibility with the warfighter;
acquisition practitioners must deliver what they say they are going to deliver when they
say they are going to deliver it.
In an effort to address senior leaders’ desire to improve speed and credibility, the
acquisition leaders released the most recent round of Lightning Bolt initiatives in 2002.
Similar sets of initiatives have been released in groups of six to ten, approximately every
two years since 1995. Two of the six initiatives released in 2002 are process oriented.
The “Focus on results, not process” initiative encourages streamlining existing
acquisition processes, challenging those that do not add value, and getting rid of the
processes that do not make sense; in turn, the initiative allows acquisition practitioners to
keep their focus on delivering capabilities that meet the needs of warfighters. The second
process initiative is designed to strengthen continuing process improvements and
communication between the government and contractors by creating a knowledge
pipeline. (Druyun, 2001; Senate Armed Services Committee, 2002)
The other four 2002 initiatives are people oriented. The spiral development
initiative is designed to encourage cooperation between warfighters and acquisition
practitioners during the development and incremental delivery of warfighting capabilities.
In other words, it makes the standard way of doing business between the acquisition
community and warfighters a collaborative effort which looks at the entire capability the
warfighter needs and incrementally delivers fully functional portions of that capability as
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funding levels will allow, until the entire capability can be delivered. The “road-block
buster” initiative gives managers a single point of contact to help them remove
administrative and bureaucratic stumbling blocks, thus freeing them to be innovative; the
Acquisition Centers of Excellence (ACE) were created to be the single point of contact
specified in this initiative. The initiative entitled “breeding innovators” targets changing
the ingrained culture of the acquisition workforce through acquisition reform education.
Finally, the last initiative sparked the creation of a Program Executive Officer (PEO) for
service contracts in order to ensure that the Air Force is leveraging its buying power as
the portion of its money spent on services contracts continues to increase. Table 1 is a
summary of the title and objective of each of the 2002 Lightning Bolts. (Druyun, 2001;
Senate Armed Services Committee, 2002)

Table 1. Summary of 2002 Acquisition Lightning Bolt Initiatives
(Consolidated from Druyun, 2001 and Senate Armed Services Committee, 2002)
2002 Lightning Bolt
Focus on results, not
process
The knowledge pipeline

Spirals: success in
increments
Road-block busters
Breeding innovators
Program Executive
Officer (PEO)/Service
contracts

Initiative Objective
Drives “clean-sheet” approach to acquisitions by
streamlining processes in order to remove non value-added
steps.
Creates a “knowledge pipeline” with industry to ensure
continual communication and process improvements
among both contractors and the government.
Makes collaborative spiral development the preferred
acquisition approach and requires collaboration between
warfighters and the acquisition community.
Frees managers to innovate and provide managers with a
focal point to help them remove bureaucratic roadblocks.
Strives to refresh, revitalize, and sustain the workforce.
Obtains the best possible value out of the rising portion of
Air Force procurement money spent on service contracts.
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This research will focus on the Lightning Bolt 2002 initiative most closely linked
with the corporate goal set for the Air Force to improve speed and credibility: “Focus on
results, not process”. This initiative drives a “clean-sheet” approach to acquisitions by
streamlining processes in order to remove non value-added steps (Senate Armed Services
Committee, 2002:¶14). In other words, the initiative frees up the administrative hands of
acquisition practitioners to allow them to be as innovative as possible within the confines
of the law. A recent example of this initiative in action is the rewriting of one of the
regulations that governs weapon system procurement within the Air Force, and the rest of
the Department of Defense (DoD), the DoD 5000 series (i.e., DoD Directive 5000.1,
DoD Instruction 5000.2, and DoD 5000.2-R). The DoD 5000 series documents were
canceled on 30 October 2002 by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Paul Wolfowitz, then
interim guidance was issued; the 5000 series documents have subsequently been revised
(Wolfowitz, 2002). DoD 5000.1 was reissued (New DoD System Acquisition Process
(DoD 5000)). DoD 5000.2 was revised; unlike the old version which focused on multiple
superfluous requirements, the new version goes in depth into the acquisition model and
looks specifically at statutory requirements and required outcomes (New DoD System
Acquisition Process (DoD 5000)). DoD 5000.2-R is no longer a mandatory document,
but is serving as the Interim DoD Acquisition Guidebook until the new streamlined DoD
Acquisition Guidebook is completed; program managers and decision authorities are now
empowered to decide what kind of information is necessary to satisfy regulatory
requirements (Defense Acquisition University Presentation; Department of Defense
(DoD), 2002; New DoD System Acquisition Process (DoD 5000)).
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With the continued push for acquisition reform and the goal of increased speed
and credibility, senior Air Force leaders want to know how well the Lightning Bolts are
actually doing their job. Currently, no metrics are in place to measure their success. This
research will create a framework for building such measures of success by examining
why metrics are important, what metrics are, the steps involved in creating metrics, the
characteristics that good metrics should possess, and how metrics can be applied to
acquisition reform initiatives; the framework will then be applied to a recent initiative
and suggest metrics for it.

Metrics
Why bother to develop metrics in the first place? Simply put: to improve
performance (Antanitus, 2003:10; Buchheim, 2000:309; Rummler and Brache,
1995:135). Metrics are frequently dubbed ‘performance measures’, meaning they tap
how well an organization is performing (Goett, 2003; Klapper, Hamblin, Hutchison,
Novak, and Vivar, 1999; Lambert and Pohlen, 2001:1; Milliken, 2001). The ultimate
goal of metrics should be “performance” not the measures themselves (Milliken, 2001).
Osborne and Gaebler (1992:147-154) note that: if the results of that performance are not
measured, success cannot be differentiated from failure; if that success cannot be seen, it
cannot be rewarded and failure is likely being rewarded instead; and if failure cannot be
recognized, it cannot be corrected. The purpose of performance measures, or metrics, is
not just to examine how an organization is performing, but to help it perform better
(Hammer, 2001:109).
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Metrics are used to improve performance; furthermore, properly structured
metrics can drive superior performance. Keebler and others (1999:13) surveyed 355
retailers, manufacturers, and transportation providers in the United States and conducted
case studies of roughly two dozen companies, and discovered a great disparity in levels
of performance. The singularly most important factor that Keebler and others (1999:13)
found to be driving superior performance was the presence of well-utilized and properly
structured measurement programs. Inadequately structured metrics can drive the wrong
behaviors and even result in dysfunctional behaviors (Neely, Richards, Mills, Platts, and
Bourne, 1997). Even though there has been a high level of interest in metrics within
industry and academia, and many methods have been suggested to develop metrics, no
one has addressed what makes up a well-designed metric and no one has compared these
methods for effectiveness (Neely and others, 1997). This research proposes that a welldesigned metric is one that is systematically created and one that possesses the attributes
of good metrics found to be common within the literature.
Additional evidence of how the use of metrics has been empirically shown to
improve performance is seen through the implementation of goal setting (see, for
example, Locke, Shaw, Saari, and Latham (1981:126)). Metrics are the feedback
mechanism by which progress toward organizational goals is measured (Office of the
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, 1999:133). For
example, as part of a recent policy directive from the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the
Air Force on improving speed and credibility within the acquisition workforce, the
Commander’s Initial Guidance section states that the overall goal is to shorten the time it
takes for decisions and getting more capable weapon systems out to the warfighter by a
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factor of four (Department of the Air Force, 10 July 2003:3). Correspondingly, the
metric to determine if that goal is met will be cycle time. By virtue of a goal being set,
metrics can be used; therefore, based on the literature, this research shows that empirical
evidence supports that the use of metrics improves performance.
The following examples further support that the implementation of metrics
increases performance. The concept of assigning workers a specific task (a term which
Locke (1982:16) notes is basically the same as a goal), along with incentive pay and time
and motion study, served as the basis for Frederick W. Taylor’s principles of scientific
management (Latham and Locke, 1979:69; Taylor, 2001:61-72). Taylor increased blue
collar worker productivity through the use of his scientific management system (Taylor,
2001:64). Locke (1968:157) later theorized that goal setting is directly tied to task
performance; he explains that difficult goals result in higher performance than easy goals,
and that specific, hard goals lead to even higher performance levels compared to
generalized “do your best” goals or no goals at all. Latham and Yukl’s (1975:824-843)
evaluation of Locke’s theory and their meta-analysis of twenty seven published and
unpublished field research reports consistently found that goal setting produces increased
performance. Also, Latham and Locke’s (1979:68-80) laboratory and field research
showed that the use of goal setting increased production by an average of nineteen
percent. In addition, Locke and others’ (1981:125,131) evaluation of one hundred and
ten laboratory and field studies on goal setting effects on task performance found that
ninety-nine of those studies showed higher performance resulted from setting specific,
hard goals than from no, “do your best,” easy, or medium goals. A significant amount of
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data attests to the presence of increased performance when goals are set, and, therefore,
when metrics are used.
In addition to metrics’ importance because of improved performance, Keebler,
Mandrodt, Durtsche, and Ledyard (1999:80-81) point out that measures aid companies in
determining how to remain competitive and confirm the value customers place on their
services. And the underlying truth within the axiom that what gets measured gets
attention is yet another reason to use metrics (Eccles, 1991:131; Osborne and Gaebler,
1992:146).
Now that the importance of metrics has been discussed, a description of what
constitutes a metric will help facilitate the explanation of this research. The Metrics
Handbook developed by Air Force Systems Command (1991:1-1) defines metrics as
meaningful measures, and data are meaningful when they allow action to be taken.
Similarly, Antanitus (2003:11) calls metrics items you would like to measure. Metrics
emphasize the customer, support organizational objectives and goals, facilitate process
understanding, and encourage continual improvement of how business is done (AFSC,
1991:1-1).
According to Clark and Wheelwright (1994:262), there are two types of measures:
results measures, which tell a team where it currently stands in its attempt to reach a goal,
rather than how it got there or what it could do differently; and process measures which
look at activities and tasks within an organization that produce given results. Also,
metrics can be expressed both qualitatively and quantitatively (Beamon, 1999).
Quantitative metrics are frequently preferred because qualitative metrics, like “poor,”
“fair,” and “good,” are vague and hard to use in a meaningful way (Beamon, 1999).
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However, quantitative metrics may not adequately discuss a system’s performance and,
as a result, may be just as vague (Beamon, 1999). Locke (1978:600) points out that it
should not be assumed that specific quantitative goals, and, in turn, metrics, are
inevitably beneficial. Some areas where results are more difficult to measure may require
qualitative goals, and, in turn, qualitative metrics (Locke, 1978:600). The decision
between qualitative and quantitative metrics depends upon the nature of the system for
which the metrics, or goals, are being established.
It is worthwhile to note that several concepts have become prevalent within the
business arena over the last two decades and have popularized, and somewhat
revolutionized, the use of metrics, namely the balanced scorecard (Kaplan and Norton,
March 2001) and benchmarking (Eccles, 1991:131). Kaplan and Norton (March 2001;
September 2001) created a way of linking metrics with the elements of an organization’s
strategy to create a new strategic management system. Metrics are one component of the
balanced scorecard. Benchmarking is information gathering in industry to compare an
organization’s performance with that of other leading organizations that do the same or
similar tasks (Camp, 1989:xiii; Eccles, 1991:133). Metrics are used in benchmarking, but
are not synonymous with it.
Metrics have been utilized in many ways to improve performance and multiple
methods have been proposed to develop them. This research looks at several of those
methods and uses their similarities to propose one generally applicable three step method
for creating metrics.
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Steps to Create Metrics.
By comparing the numerous methods for systematically developing metrics that
exist within the literature, this research found that nearly all of the methods share three
common steps which will later be discussed. Of the literature reviewed, twelve authors
presented thirteen general frameworks for creating metrics. The number of steps
involved in each framework ranged from three steps up to eleven steps. For example,
Clark and Wheelwright (1994:272-273) suggest a four step method: a) define factors
critical to customer satisfaction; b) map cross-functional process through which results
are obtained; c) identify capabilities and tasks necessary to complete process
successfully; and d) design measures to track those capabilities and tasks. Rummler and
Brache (1995:137-138) recommend a similar four step sequence: a) clearly establish the
most important outputs of the process, job, or organization; b) for each output, establish
the “critical dimensions” of performance; c) create measures for every critical dimension;
and d) create standards, or goals, for each measure. In contrast, Eccles and Pyburn
(1992) suggest a five step process that does not share the three steps found to be common
among the other authors: a) choose non-financial measures that will compliment
financial measures, determine relationships between them, and the create firm’s business
performance model; b) establish methodology to be used to take the measures; c) select
the frequency and layout of performance measurement reports; d) adjust how personnel
are compensated and evaluated to encourage desired behavioral changes that will
improve activity performance; and e) realize that a key element of a performance
measurement system is that it will evolve with time as managers grow and increase their
knowledge of measures’ relationships to one another and as conditions change. A
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complete illustration of the general steps for creating metrics for all twelve authors found
in the literature is shown in Table 2.
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Table 2. General Steps for Creating Metrics within Literature
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Table 2. General Steps for Creating Metrics within Literature (continued)
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Table 2. General Steps for Creating Metrics within Literature (continued)
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No empirical evidence was found within the literature to suggest that any one
particular method was better to use than any other. One size does not fit all and many
differences exist among the authors’ approaches, but three basic steps remained common
among eleven of the thirteen frameworks examined (INCOSE, 1998:9). First, establish a
starting point upon which to base the metrics; determine what you want to measure.
Second, identify the most important elements of what you want to measure. Third, create
specific metrics for those critical elements so as to improve the performance of the item
being measured. If metrics are created by systematically following these three general
steps and they possess the attributes of good metrics they will be properly-structured
metrics and will have the potential to drive superior performance (Keebler and others,
1999:13).
Attributes of Good Metrics.
Certain characteristics distinguish good metrics from bad ones and well-designed
metrics possess those good characteristics. Fourteen authors in the literature describe
forty three distinct attributes that good metrics possess. The following are a
representative list of the good metric attributes in the literature. Beamon (1999) says that
good metrics have six characteristics: consistency with organizational goals,
inclusiveness of pertinent aspects, measurability, meeting of customer goals and values,
relating to strategic goals and mission of organization, and universality. In comparison,
Buchheim (2000:311) describes good metrics as having eight characteristics, only one of
which is common with those cited by Beamon (i.e, relating to strategic goals and
mission). According to Buchheim (2000:311), good metrics: have a defined sensor that
gathers and records data, like an automated test station data file or a clerk; have a defined
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unit of measurement (e.g., hours per widget produced); are meaningful to the customer;
measure results versus process (e.g., measure the level of skill demonstrated using a
widget versus the number of days spent attending training sessions); have a regular
frequency with which reports and measurements are done (e.g., monthly average failure
rate); are simple to use; and are understandable. A third source finds that good metrics
possess three characteristics, only one of which is shared with Beamon’s and Buchheim’s
attributes; Evans and Lindsay (2002:464,466) agree with both Beamon and Buchheim
that good metrics relate to the strategic goals and mission of the organization involved,
but also state that good metrics are actionable and useful.
Table 3 summarizes the attributes of “good” metrics as described in the literature.
The elements that are common among the research are illustrated with this presentation.
Of the works shown in Table 3, six authors claim that metrics should relate to the
organizational mission and strategic goals, five suggest that simplicity is an important
quality of metrics, and five state that good metrics are meaningful to customers. Four
authors also point out that metrics should be understandable and derivable from
economically collectible data (i.e., cost effective). All other attributes in Table 3 are
common among three authors or less.
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Table 3. Common Attributes of Good Metrics

AFSC = Air Force Systems Command
INCOSE = International Council on Systems Engineering
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Table 3. Common Attributes of Good Metrics (continued)

AFSC = Air Force Systems Command
INCOSE = International Council on Systems Engineering
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Table 3. Common Attributes of Good Metrics (continued)

AFSC = Air Force Systems Command
INCOSE = International Council on Systems Engineering
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Application of Metrics to Acquisition Reform Initiatives.
In order to create a framework for developing measures of success for corporate
level Air Force acquisition initiatives, not only must it be understood how to create wellstructured metrics, but it must be understood how those metrics can be applied to
acquisition reform initiatives. Metrics can be used to track the progress of supply chain
initiatives (Klapper and others, 1999). The supply chain is made up of all the activities
relating to the transformation and flow of goods from the point of extraction of raw
materials, through to the end users (Monczka and others, 2002:4). The military
acquisition community manages and oversees the activities involved in the procurement
of weapon systems, from initial development and procurement, through delivery to the
warfighters, all the way to the end of a weapon system’s life cycle when it is retired or
sent to the “bone yard” at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona; therefore, a supply
chain perspective is appropriate for analyzing the weapon system acquisition and
management process. Accordingly, metrics can be used to monitor the progress of
acquisition reform initiatives.
Metrics appropriate for acquisition reform enable an organization to assess reform
initiatives’ effectiveness and implementation on both acquisition programs and the
acquisition reform process itself (Pope, 1997:75-76). Groups within the DoD have
proposed various metrics to measure acquisition reform; for instance, Pope (1997:57,7577) notes that the Navy was working towards using metrics, such as the average cycle
time for issuance of requests for proposals, to help gauge the use of some of their
acquisition reform initiatives. But most acquisition metrics have been used for individual
acquisition programs; for example, a specific acquisition program, like a program to buy
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radios for an aircraft, might employ a metric like schedule variance to measure the
percentage increase or decrease in the time it takes a contractor to deliver radios bought
in one month compared to the delivery time of radios bought another month (Pope,
1997:75-77). No systematic approach to performance measurement or standardized set
of metrics for acquisition reform initiatives currently exists (Beamon, 1999; Pope,
1997:75-77).
In an effort to address the lack of standardized metrics for acquisition initiatives,
the Acquisition Reform Benchmarking Group (ARBG) was established by the DoD in
1996 to help measure progress within the arena of acquisition reform (Pope, 1997:34-35).
Pope (1997:35) determined that the findings of the ARBG divide metrics into three
levels: program, subordinate, and enterprise. Metrics at their most basic level measure
elements within individual acquisition programs, or “little ‘a’” acquisitions, as Sambur
refers to acquisitions at the program level (DiCicco, 2003). Subordinate metrics measure
factors that feed into the highest level of metrics, which are enterprise metrics. Enterprise
metrics measure the efficiency of overarching or generalizable processes that should be
measured across the whole Air Force (Pope, 1997:34-35) (i.e., termed “big ‘A’”
Acquisitions related metrics within this occupational community) (DiCicco, 2003).
Enterprise metrics include cost, schedule, performance, and training metrics. The
acquisition initiative this research focuses on pertains to “big ‘A’” Acquisitions and the
metrics this research will recommend be used to assess that initiative are enterprise level
metrics.
Pope (1997:26) found that metrics can also be categorized by the three types of
activities that they measure, as defined by the 1995 Process Action Team (PAT) for
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contract administration reform: go/no-go, activities, and behavioral changes. Go/no-go
metrics show whether or not an activity has taken place. Activity metrics illustrate how
extensively an action is occurring. And behavioral change metrics assess whether actions
are creating the desired change in behavior or results. Part of the objective of this
research is to help determine whether or not the use of the acquisition initiative of interest
is an effective way to bring about the desired changes in the acquisition practitioners’
behavior. Specifically, the acquisition practitioners who participated in this research
were queried about whether the initiative of interest was the most effective way to get
them to take the “clean-sheet” approach to acquisitions that the initiative was meant to
encourage. Additionally, part of the metrics recommended by this research will fall
within the behavioral change category. Now that a framework for building metrics has
been established by reviewing metrics’ importance, composition, creative steps, good
attributes, and application to acquisition reform initiatives, that framework will be
applied in a case study.

Summary
Acquisition reform initiatives have been born out of senior Air Force leaders’
vision of a faster, better acquisition process and an improved relationship between the
acquisition community and the warfighters they support. This research focuses on
developing metrics for one such initiative. Many theories exist about what constitutes
good metrics and what the steps involved in creating metrics are. A large part of the
literature review and additional research for this thesis identify those theories and
examine the commonalities among them. Using those recurrent elements, a model will
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be developed for building acquisition metrics. The literature suggests that the metrics
from the model should be systematically developed using three general steps: 1) create a
foundation the metrics will be based upon (i.e., what the metrics are intended to focus on
and be built from), 2) identify the critical elements that you want to measure, and 3)
create specific metrics for those critical elements in order to improve the system’s
performance. According to the literature, the model’s metrics should also have five
attributes commonly found among good metrics: relatedness to the organization’s
strategic goals and mission, simplicity, meaningfulness to customers, understandability,
and cost effectiveness (AFSC, 1991:2-1; Antanitus, 2003:11; Beamon, 1999; Brown,
1996:3-10; Buchheim, 2000:311; Evans and Lindsay, 2002:455,466; Keebler and others,
1999:118-121; INCOSE, 1998:9; Milliken, 2001; Pinker and others, 1997:193; Rummler
and Brache, 1995:138). In addition, the literature indicates that it is preferred for metrics
to be quantifiable, but that sometimes qualitative metrics more adequately discuss system
performance; the choice between qualitative and quantitative depends on the nature of the
subject matter being measured (Beamon, 1999; Locke, 1978:600). To better understand
the applications of the model for broad use with any large acquisition initiative, a case
study will be conducted by applying the model to the 2002 acquisition Lightning Bolt
initiative “Focus on results, not process.” Chapter three will discuss, in detail, the
methodology to be used in this study.

27

III. Methodology

The goal of this research is to suggest a model for developing performance
measures for corporate Air Force level acquisition based initiatives. Because this
research is exploratory, it will focus on only one initiative: the 2002 Lighting Bolt
initiative “Focus on results, not process.” To do this, interviews were conducted and the
interview data were translated into metrics for the initiative. A qualitative analysis of the
interview data was also done using a protocol based on those of Carter and Jennings
(2002:145-179), Creswell (1997:142-146; 2003:196-215), Isabella (1990:7-41), and
Leedy and Ormrod (2001:95,98,196). A variety of themes and patterns emerged from the
interview data through the analysis. Subsequently, the level of success the Lightning
Bolt initiative is having was also examined. From those results, metrics are suggested for
application against the “Focus on results, not process” initiative and for broader,
generalized use with any large acquisition based initiatives. A description of the
interview process is provided below.

Methodological Overview
Based on the nature of the research question, a qualitative approach was used to
guide the research project based on the procedures outlined by Creswell (2003:179-215).
In the current qualitative research effort, data was collected through a series of semistructured interviews (Creswell, 2003:210-215). After the interviews were transcribed,
the transcriptions were broken down into statements and analyzed for common themes.
Specifically, the interviews were designed to generate a list of metrics that can be used to
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measure the Lightning Bolt of interest and determine the extent to which this Lightning
Bolt is appropriately facilitating desired changes.
The qualitative study findings are envisioned to be reinforced by future, follow-on
quantitative research that should support and further validate the qualitative findings,
while expanding the analysis to a large representative sample. As part of the future
quantitative research, these qualitative data will be translated into a questionnaire that can
be used to evaluate the list of metrics generated and to gather more insight into the
Lightning Bolt’s appropriateness from a broader audience. The findings from both
phases should be integrated as part of future research where the quantitative data will be
used to reinforce and confirm the qualitative results. In the subsequent sections, the
nuances of this methodology are explained.
Interview Sample.
In 2001, Acquisition Centers of Excellence (ACE) were established for the Air
Force, Air Force Materiel Command, Air Force Product Centers, and Air Logistic
Centers to lead acquisition reform efforts (New Acquisition Center Provides Warfighting
Capabilities, 2001; Lightning Bolts, 2004). Part of their duties is to oversee the
implementation of the Lightning Bolt initiatives. As a result, the ACE offices have
helped system program office (SPO) leadership understand and implement the initiatives.
Therefore, in this research, members at the ACE offices and various system program
offices (SPOs) within the Air Force’s Product Centers and Air Logistics Centers were
interviewed. To further broaden the research sample, individuals holding various
acquisition related positions within Air Combat Command, Air Force Space Command,
and Air Staff were also interviewed. Modeling Carter and Jennings (2002:150), the
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sample interviewed was chosen with the intent of getting a high degree of variation
among managerial levels, in order to get a higher range or scope of data.
The ACE personnel were asked to identify interview participants, within the
SPOs, who have experience with the 2002 Lightning Bolt initiative of interest. The letter
requesting ACE office assistance in identifying interview participants is shown in
Appendix A. The letter describes the target interview audience as consisting of 40-50
SPO members evenly distributed among the Product and Logistics Centers, holding
various levels of managerial responsibility, and having experience using the “Focus on
results, not process” Lightning Bolt. The letter also asks the Secretariat of the Air Force
Acquisition Center of Excellence (SAF/ACE) office to utilize subordinate Center ACEs
to identify interview subjects within this target audience who would then be contacted to
participate in this research.
Of the fourteen Center ACEs queried for assistance by the SAF/ACE, two
provided contact information for interview participants. The two respondent Center
ACEs were from separate locations; participants from Acquisition Category (ACAT) one
and two programs were identified at one location and from ACAT three programs at the
other location. ACAT describes program size and dollar amount and ranges from one,
being the largest and most expensive programs, to three, being the smallest and least
expensive. Six Center ACEs gave negative replies (three of which were initially nonrespondent, but gave negative replies when asked again) and cited several reasons why:
individuals at their location had no experience with the initiative of interest; they sent a
message out to SPOs asking for participants and got no replies back; due to the nature of
the mission at their location (e.g., a test and evaluation organization) they did not use the
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initiative of interest; they never received the request from the SAF/ACE asking for
assistance with the research; and since their location was neither a Product nor Logistics
Center (e.g., a Test Center), they thought the request for research assistance did not apply
to them. Some Center ACEs cited more than one reason for their negative replies. The
six remaining Center ACEs were completely non-responsive even after being queried a
second time.
When the low Center ACE response rate was observed, it was realized that a
broader interview sample was needed and that individuals with acquisition experience
from Air Combat Command, Air Force Space Command, and Air Staff should be
included among interview participants. Additional participants were identified with the
assistance of the SAF/ACE, through interview participants recommending that other
specific individuals be contacted for interviews (also referred to as ‘snowball sampling’),
and through personal contacts of the researcher. A total of twenty five participants were
identified and interviewed, but only twenty three interviews were usable; nineteen verbal
interviews were successfully transcribed, two verbal interview recordings were inaudible
and subsequently unusable, two interviews were recorded using only notes taken during
the interviews, and two interviews were conducted via email.
Interview Correspondence.
Potential interview participants were identified and then contacted to determine
their willingness to participate. Upon their agreement to assist with this research,
participants were sent a formal invitation letter from the SAF/ACE office. This letter,
displayed as Appendix B, explains that the research is designed to help develop metrics
of success for the Lightning Bolt of interest. It also explains that any data gathered from
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the interviews will remain confidential and that participants will not be identifiable. In
addition, the letter contains a list of the interview questions. The interview questions
were provided prior to conducting the interviews so that participants could prepare, in
hopes of making the interviews more efficient and effective.
After interview candidates were identified and invited to participate, each was
contacted via email or telephone to schedule an interview time. Prior to the scheduled
interviews, each participant was contacted to confirm his or her availability for the
interview. Then, the interviews were conducted face-to-face, over the telephone, and
using email. Notes were taken during each verbal interview, and interviews were
recorded and transcribed (with the interviewee’s permission) whenever possible.
Appendix C is a global appendix of the additional exchanges that took place with
interview subjects. A schedule reminder was emailed to participants to reiterate the time
and date of each interview. The reminder also acted as a confirmation of participants’
availability for the interviews. Also included in Appendix C is a copy of the interview
script that was used. The script addresses the intent of the research to develop metrics for
the Lightning Bolt of interest, and the assurance that the data collected during the
interviews will remain confidential. The interview questions address subjects’ views
about: a) the purpose and goals of the “Focus on results, not process” Lightning Bolt
initiative; b) metrics to be used to measure the successful implementation of the
initiative; c) their role in the initiative’s implementation; and d) support being received to
implement the initiative.
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Interview Method.
The interviews included open-ended items, allowing participants to go in different
directions. However, in this research, a semi-structured interview approach was used in
order to address the topics of interest about participants’ use of the Lightning Bolt, within
the interview time constraints. A semi-structured interview enabled the research to
follow the standard questions in Appendix C while allowing the latitude to include a few
tailored questions to probe or clarify a participant’s reasoning. (Leedy and Ormrod,
2001:196)
Following Carter and Jennings (2002:152) and Leedy and Ormrod (2001:98), face
validity of the interview questions has been assessed using several methods. First, the
questions were reviewed by knowledgeable academicians and acquisition practitioners.
Based on this expert review, redundant questions were removed; a few questions were
reworded to prevent leading the participants and to make the questions more objective;
and a few questions were added based on the reviewers’ suggestions. Second, after ten
percent of the interviews were conducted, they were transcribed and reviewed to
determine whether themes were emerging and if questions were clear to participants; the
interview questions were refined and adjusted accordingly. Interviewing is a dynamic
process, so data was continually analyzed throughout the process and the interview
questions adjusted as needed.
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Analysis Technique
Data Analysis.
The qualitative data collected was analyzed using Creswell’s (1997:142-146) data
analysis spiral. Using this spiral, data was reviewed multiple times while going through
the following steps:
1. Organization: Organize the data using a computer database. Break large portions
of text into smaller units (i.e., sentence and individual words).
2. Perusal: Peruse the whole data set many times to get the big picture of what it
contains as a whole. Write down potential interpretations and categories while
perusing.
3. Classification: Identify recurrent themes and categories, and classify or group
each datum accordingly. In this step patterns should begin to emerge.
4. Synthesis: Integrate and summarize the data. Develop propositions or
hypotheses that describe categorical relationships. Create diagrams, tables,
matrices, etc. to illustrate proposed relationships.
Validation.
Creswell (2003:196) suggests eight strategies for validating the accuracy of
findings, three of which applied to the findings of this research. The first validation
strategy employed is to clearly state the biases the researcher brings to the study and
those that exist due to the nature of the research (Creswell, 2003:196). The following are
potential biases. First, the self-reporting nature of interviews makes them inherently
biased. Second, the interviews only look at a snapshot in time in terms of the
participants’ responses, meaning the data are transient in nature, so interview responses

34

may be different at different points in time (Leedy and Ormrod, 2001:95). Third, there
could be a possible sample bias because participants are not being selected randomly.
However, follow-on research could counter this bias by randomly selecting a sample that
represents the population of Air Force acquisition practitioners.
Peer debriefing is the second strategy to validate the findings of this research.
Experienced acquisition practitioners who are familiar with this area of research reviewed
and asked questions about the qualitative portions of the research. This was done to help
ensure the accuracy of the findings and to make the explanation of this research clearer
for an outside audience (i.e., readers other than the researcher). (Creswell, 2003:196)
Following Isabella (1990:13) and utilizing Creswell’s (2003:196) third strategy,
external auditors were used to review the entire research project. As part of the
qualitative data analysis, recurrent themes were identified and interview data categorized
accordingly. Non-acquisition and acquisition professionals who were new to the research
project were given a list of statements from the interviews and a list of the themes that
emerged. These individuals were then asked to categorize the interview statements under
the themes they thought were appropriate matches. The purpose of this was to see if the
external auditors found that the same interview statements represent the themes as
intended. The independent categorization provided by the auditors validates the
classification and synthesis of the data. The external auditors assessed the project at the
conclusion of the research process.
The qualitative analysis of the interview data, combined with the steps to create
metrics and characteristics of good metrics that were revealed through the literature,
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enable the building of metrics for the initiative of interest. The following sections
describe what was gleaned from the literature.

Literature Findings
The literature reviewed for this research was used to identify a set of three
generalized steps for creating metrics and a comprehensive list of desirable qualities for
metrics. Table 2 and Table 3 (previously shown in chapter two) illustrate the way these
steps and attributes were captured, respectively, the matrices of steps and attributes, and
the authors who have identified the various steps and attributes.
Consolidation of Steps for Creating Metrics.
Methods for creating metrics suggested by multiple authors in the literature were
compared to one another and searched for common elements. Similarities between the
methods were merged into one generalized three step process for creating metrics. The
three step method includes: 1) decide what is to be measured, 2) identify the critical
aspects of the item to be measured, and 3) create specific metrics for each critical aspect
in order to improve performance. The metrics suggested by this research will not only be
developed using this systematic process, they will embody the attributes of good metrics.
Attribute Identification.
After all the literature was reviewed, the list of attributes identified was funneled
down into a core set of five common attributes to eliminate redundancy. Attributes
agreed upon by four or more authors are included in the core set. Those attributes
include: relatedness to the organization’s strategic goals and mission, simplicity,
meaningfulness to customers, understandability, and cost effectiveness (AFSC, 1991:2-1;
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Antanitus, 2003:11; Beamon, 1999; Brown, 1996:3-10; Buchheim, 2000:311; Evans and
Lindsay, 2002:455,466; Keebler and others, 1999:118-121; INCOSE, 1998:9; Milliken,
2001; Pinker and others, 1997:193; Rummler and Brache, 1995:138).
Core Attributes.
The first dimension of good metrics to be measured is that they relate to the
strategic goals and mission of the organization involved (Antanitus, 2003:11; Beamon,
1999; Buchheim, 2000:311; Evans and Lindsay, 2002:455; Milliken, 2001; Pinker and
others, 1997:191). This relationship is important so the organization can determine if it is
meeting its strategic goals, and so people within the organization will focus on what is
being measured, thereby steering the direction of the organization (Beamon, 1999).
The second dimension is that the metric must be meaningful to the customer
(AFSC, 1991:2-1; Brown, 1996:6; Buchheim, 2000:311; Pinker and others, 1997:193;
Rummler and Brache, 1995:138). A metric is meaningful when it is something the
customer cares about (Buchheim, 2000:311). And it must present data that enables action
to be taken (AFSC, 1991:1-1).
The third dimension of good metrics is simplicity (AFSC, 1991:2-1; Buchheim,
2000:311; INCOSE, 1998:9; Pinker and others, 1997:193). Simplicity means that the
metric must be as simple and logical as possible, so it will be easy to collect, analyze, and
understand (INCOSE, 1998:9).
The fourth dimension good metrics need is that they must be derivable from
economically collectible data (AFSC, 1991:2-1; INCOSE, 1998:9; Keebler and others,
1999:119-121; Pinker and others, 1997:193). An organization must decide if it is cost
effective to collect data for each metric. The organization has to determine if they can or
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cannot afford to collect the data, and if the data offers greater value than it costs
(INCOSE, 1998:9).
The fifth dimension is that good metrics must be understandable (AFSC, 1991:21; Buchheim, 2000:311; Keebler and others, 1999:119; Pinker and others, 1997:193).
When a metric can convey, with just a cursory level look, how it was derived and what
exactly it is measuring then, Keebler and others (1999:119) say, it is easy to understand.
Now that the five core attributes have been defined, the data gathered from the
interviews can be analyzed and metrics for the initiative of interest developed by using
the three general steps for creating metrics and ensuring that the created metrics possess
the good attributes.

Summary
A qualitative method approach has been used to conduct this research project.
Data from the qualitative analysis was applied to the information gathered from the
literature about the steps involved in creating metrics and the characteristics that good
metrics are supposed to have, in order to develop metrics for the “Focus on results, not
process” Lightning Bolt initiative. These four elements together, meaning the data from
interview participants, the steps to creating metrics, the good attributes, and the initiative
of interest used as a case study, build the framework for developing research based
metrics for any large acquisition based program.
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IV. Data Analysis

The focus of this effort is to create a framework for developing measures of
success for corporate level Air Force acquisition initiatives. A four part framework has
been suggested. Through the review of literature, common steps for creating metrics
were established and recurrent characteristics of good metrics were identified. Then
interviews were conducted with acquisition practitioners who have experience with the
initiative of interest. Finally, those three parts will be applied to the “Focus on results,
not process” Lighting Bolt initiative as a case study and metrics for the initiative will be
suggested as a result. This chapter discusses data collected during the interviews and the
subsequent analysis. Multiple patterns and themes were discovered during the qualitative
analysis of the data. Chapter five will discuss the conclusions drawn from the analysis
and recommend the implementation of several related activities. The following sections
describe the data.

Interview Participants
Interviews were conducted with Air Force officers and Air Force government
civilians from Air Combat Command, Air Force Materiel Command, Air Force Space
Command, and the Air Staff. Individuals ranged in rank from GS-12s to Senior
Executive Service (SES) members and General Officers. Participants held a variety of
positions from System Program Office (SPO) level program managers, contracting
officers, and division chiefs, to Program Executive Officers (PEOs) and Center
Commanders, to Secretary of the Air Force staff level positions (i.e., Assistant Secretary
of the Air Force for Acquisition (SAF/AQ) related positions). Their time in federal
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service ranged from five years up to thirty one years. The high degree of variety in
participants’ managerial levels and areas of expertise provided a high range or scope of
data (Carter and Jennings, 2002:150).
For purposes of maintaining participant confidentiality, GM-15s, GS-15s, and
Senior Executive Service members (excluding those within the Air Staff), and System
Program Directors, Program Executive Officers (PEOs), and Center Commanders who
participated in this research will be categorized as “middle management.” Interview
participants referred to this grouping of people as middle management, to Assistant
Secretary of the Air Force equivalent positions and above as “senior leadership,” and to
Deputy System Program Director equivalent positions and below as “SPO level
workers.” Note that most middle managers, and some workers, are actually relatively
senior, experienced personnel; the categories are essentially a self-classification by the
participants of their positions relative to other participants’ positions.

Analysis Overview
Modeling Isabella (1990:13), when the data collection was completed, interview
participants’ responses to each interview question were systematically and carefully
examined to identify both recurrent and unique themes. Every interview transcript was
reviewed and sections of the interviews were excerpted verbatim and typed on separate
pieces of paper to illustrate the nucleus of each individual’s statements (Isabella,
1990:13). After excerpts were perused, as part of Creswell’s (2003:142-146) data
analysis spiral, they were classified into recurrent themes and categories. Isabella
(1990:13) refers to this as coding into final categories. Roughly seven hundred excerpts
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were recorded. Category coding accuracy was ensured using external auditors (Creswell,
2003:196; Isabella, 1990:13). Representative examples of data (i.e., interview excerpts)
were given to independent reviewers, or external auditors, including acquisition
practitioners and non-acquisition practitioners new to the research project (Creswell,
2003:196; Isabella, 1990:13). The reviewers were then trained in the rationale used for
coding excerpts into categories (Creswell, 2003:196; Isabella, 1990:13). Due to the large
number of total interview excerpts, reviewers were given a limited number of excerpts to
code. In one such instance, reviewers were asked to code seventy eight excerpts about
what metrics should be used for the initiative of interest and they classified fifty six
excerpts into the same categories as the researcher, giving a seventy two percent level of
agreement (Creswell, 2003:196; Isabella, 1990:13). Reviewers’ results provided
reasonable verification of coding procedure accuracy (Creswell, 2003:196; Isabella,
1990:13). The patterns and themes revealed through this coding are described below in
greater detail for each interview question. As the focus of this research is developing
measures of success for acquisition initiatives, the themes and patterns that emerged from
the interview questions directly pertaining to metrics for the initiative of interest will be
addressed first and the findings from the remaining interview questions discussed
thereafter.
Suggested Metrics to Measure the Success of “Focus on results, not process”
Initiative Implementation.
Two interview questions directly addressed metrics for the initiative of interest.
Interview participants were asked what metrics they would use to measure the results the
initiative was meant to bring about, and then later in the interview participants were

41

asked how they would know if they were succeeding at implementing the initiative. Out
of participants’ responses, five main categories of metrics were recurrent: schedule,
customer satisfaction, cost, performance, and credibility.
The theme most identified by participants was schedule. Schedule, also called an
acquisition program baseline, refers to the lengths of time a program has set to
accomplish various tasks. Based on participant responses, the category of schedule also
includes a sub-category of cycle time, meaning the length of time from identifying a need
for something until it is delivered. One way to classify cycle time is by whether it is
oriented around capability or around documentation. Capability based cycle time refers
to the amount of time between the warfighter stating his need for a new capability (e.g.,
being able to detect enemy troop movements within buildings) and that capability is
being delivered (e.g., an infrared sensor is installed on an aircraft). Documentation based
cycle time refers to acquisition lead-time or the time it takes to complete a document
related activity (e.g., the time it takes for a contract to be negotiated until the legal
document is signed by the parties and processed out). This theme is directly related to
Sambur’s (Senate Armed Services Committee, 2002:¶11) call for improved speed; the
acquisition community has to deliver things when they say they are going to deliver
them. Seventy four percent of participants identified schedule as a metric category for
the initiative of interest.
Customer satisfaction with the product, process, or service being provided was the
second most frequently named metric category. In the participants’ view, customer
satisfaction also encompasses a sub-category of expectation management. A large part of
how satisfied the customer is depends on whether they received what they were
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expecting. Sixty one percent of participants named customer satisfaction as a metric
category.
Cost was the third most identified theme. This theme is self explanatory; it deals
with activities related to money. This theme occurred among thirty nine percent of
participants.
Performance was the fourth most recurring theme for these interview questions.
It refers to how well or how poorly a product, process, or program is performing
compared to program specifications and customer expectations. Both customer
satisfaction and performance address expectations; of the two, performance is the more
direct comparison against expected capability, and customer satisfaction addresses a
more comprehensive assessment of all customer expectations. Twenty six percent of
participants suggested metrics that fit into this category.
Credibility was the fifth category of participant interview responses. Credibility
for the acquisition workforce would mean that their customers, mainly the warfighters,
would believe what they tell them and find them trustworthy. This also ties in with
Sambur’s (Senate Armed Services Committee, 2002:¶11) call to improve credibility; the
acquisition community has to deliver what they say they are going to deliver. However,
the occurrence of this theme among only seventeen percent of participants does not seem
to support Sambur’s push for improved credibility; this indicates that not many people
see measuring credibility as a way of telling if this initiative is succeeding. In contrast,
the frequent recurrence of schedule among seventy four percent of participants does offer
support for Sambur’s call for speed.
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The remaining interview excerpts for these questions that did not seem to fit into a
particular category were placed in a miscellaneous category. Following Isabella’s
(1990:13-22) example, Table 4 displays representative excerpts from responses to the
interview question “What metrics would you use to measure those results or outcomes?”
and illustrates how responses flowed across each of the five categories described above.
Table 5 displays the same information as Table 4 for to the second specific metrics
related question of “How would you know if you are succeeding at implementing the
initiative?”.
The rest of the chapter discusses themes that emerged from answers to the
remaining fifteen interview questions. These additional questions pertain to areas of
supplemental interest to the sponsor of this research project, and some are related to the
development of generic acquisition initiatives. The conclusions and recommendations
reached from the data analysis will be discussed later.
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Table 4. Interview Excerpt Categorization for Suggested Initiative Metrics
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Table 5. Interview Excerpt Categorization for
Measuring Initiative Implementation Success
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Meaning of 2002 Lighting Bolt “Focus on results, not process” Initiative.
Interview participants were asked what they thought the initiative of interest
meant. Interview participants included individuals who helped to draft the initiative, one
of whom stated the following about what the initiative was intended to mean:
Too many people within the acquisition community focus on completing
processes (reports, assessments, checklists, etc). The Lighting Bolt aimed to
cause people to look at the result intended by the process and to make a judgment
of whether the activity planned actually furthers the opportunity for success.
Success isn’t getting through the process – its delivering a needed capability to
the warfighter!
A variety of responses were provided by participants and then grouped by the themes that
emerged. The main themes that emerged are listed below in order of how frequently they
occurred, from highest to lowest. For several interview questions, some excerpts applied
to more than one category or theme (see, for example, excerpts within the categories of
Table 4 and Table 5). And when relevant and necessary for clarity, more than one
excerpt was selected from a participant in order to capture the nucleus of their response
and in order to reflect how adamantly they responded to the interview question (i.e., they
stated their response to an interview question multiple times, with differing explanatory
nuances in each response); this explains why excerpt frequency counts are higher than the
number of participants in several of the following sections. For example, the first theme
that arose for this interview question was from ten excerpts shared among ten
participants, while the second theme came out of nine excerpts from eight participants,
and the other themes occurred among four participants or less. Appendix D summarizes
descriptive statistics for each theme.
•

Focus on the end customer not the acquisition process itself; support the
customer
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Does what we are doing make sense and does it add value? If not, get rid of it
or waive it; remove the unnecessary steps
Freeing people up
Focus on getting the product out; effects based or outcome based acquisitions
Want results not just process
Clean-sheet approach
The initiative has little meaning and little use
Sets the stage for spiral acquisition and evolutionary acquisition
Risk management
Process must serve results
Changing people’s mindset to look at what they can do versus what they
cannot

Desired Results or Outcomes of Initiative.
Next, participants were asked what they thought were the desired outcomes or
results that the initiative was trying to accomplish. Multiple themes were identified from
the interview data, the first of which occurred within eleven excerpts among nine
respondents, the second from ten excerpts between eight respondents, and the remainder
from five excerpts among four respondents or less. The following are the themes for this
question in order of frequency. Included in Appendix D is a summary of descriptive
statistics for each theme.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Support the Agile Acquisition strategy; provide capability in a timely way
without getting bogged down in the processes
Change people’s way of thinking; be creative, innovative, and use common
sense
Get people to think about the outcome not the how
Promises made, promises kept
Roadblocks exist to accomplishing initiative outcomes from 1) middle
management, 2) SAF/AQ staff and other services, and 3) contracting
Unchain the process and make bureaucrats look at the big picture
Goals are unclear
Challenge decision makers when necessary; risk management
Freeing up the workforce, empowering them

48

Appropriateness of Initiative Goals.
Participants were also asked if they thought the goals of the initiative were
appropriate. One of the authors of the initiative described the goals, or outcomes, of the
initiative in the following way:
… it's from Secretary Roche, General Jumper, Dr. Sambur and at the time,
General Lyles, Materiel Command Commander, all endorsed the speed and
credibility as the two primary outcomes that they wanted from this -- from the
work force and the acquisition system and it was this Focus on Results, Not
Process Lightning Bolt which attempted to write a policy on how we do business
that -- that does that. The outcome is the result itself, not the process.
Based on their understanding of what they thought the goals or outcomes of the initiative
to be, twenty of the twenty three participants stated that they felt the goals were
appropriate. However, when asked if they felt using this initiative was the most
appropriate way to accomplish the goals that it was meant to accomplish, several
participants offered various criticisms of the initiative. A few of those criticisms are
listed below.
One middle management participant said:
… Well, they posted these lightning bolts, but they didn’t give me background
behind them. I mean, what is the motive for this? Sometimes just because you
put something out, clear, in black and white print, unless you know what the
under-pinning motive is behind it, everyone will enact upon it differently.
Another middle management participant stated:
… At the time of the Lightning Bolts - as long as Mrs. Druyun was the champion,
you could roll over the bureaucracy. When she wasn’t, there wasn’t any
institutional memory to show why or how you could have waived things…
And one SPO level worker remarked:
… It's got to be more than just saying, you know, this is a Lightning Bolt and we
want everybody to follow it…. It has to be a top down mindset change, you
know. It has to have the support of the senior leaders. It has to be harped on over

49

and over and over again, this is the sorts of things that we're trying to do… And
you can't just leave it for the -- the actual day-to-day employee to overcome the
inertia of things the way they've always done it... And there's a couple reasons for
that. One, it's just inertia. Two, it's because people are afraid of getting squashed
if they do something and it doesn't work… One of the things that -- that we have
to be real careful about is -- is punishing failures because you can't come up with
new things unless you try things and fail from time to time.
Most Important Aspects of the Initiative.
The interview participants were then asked what they considered to be the most
important aspects of the “Focus on results, not process” initiative. Four main themes
were identified within the data and were close in frequency of occurrence among
participants. Organizational culture was the most recurring theme; nine excerpts from six
participants reflected this theme. Participants stated that an entrepreneurial mindset was
the next most important aspect which includes, but is not limited to, becoming creative,
not being risk averse, taking bold steps to challenge the status quo, and thinking
differently. Seven interview excerpts among seven participants noted this aspect.
Responsiveness to the customer was the next most frequently seen theme with six
excerpts among five participants. Lastly, five excerpts from four participants shared the
theme of communication. Appendix D includes summary descriptive statistics for each
theme.
How Participants Heard about the Initiative.
Next participants were asked how they had actually heard of the initiative. Four
participants said that they had not heard of the “Focus on results, not process” concept as
a formal initiative until they were contacted about this research project; but, based on
their interview responses they had actually already been carrying out the intent of the
initiative within their jobs. Those participants included two SPO program managers, a
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Deputy SPO Director, and an Air Staff member. Among those participants who had
heard of the initiative, the sources from which they learned of the initiative were varied.
The most frequent source of introduction to the initiative was through participants’ chains
of command and normal information distribution channels; seven excerpts from seven
participants shared this theme. The next most recurring theme was direct involvement
with Druyun, the originator of the initiative. Six excerpts from five participants shared
this theme. Three excerpts from three participants noted direct contributions to writing
the initiative. And the three remaining themes observed from single excerpts among
individual participants were acquisition reform training, Sambur’s (Department of the Air
Force, 4 February 2003) letter to the acquisition community introducing the initiative as
part of the new push for improved speed and credibility, and working in an Acquisition
Center of Excellence (ACE) office. Appendix D summarizes the descriptive statistics.
Next Step in “Focusing on Results”.
In addition to being asked to explain how they had heard about the initiative,
participants were asked what the next step should be in order to get the acquisition
community to actually implement the objectives of the initiative and really focus on the
results. There were as many responses to this question as there were interview
participants. The most frequent theme within the interview responses for this question
was seen within six excerpts shared among four participants. The second most frequent
theme came from six excerpts among three participants. The next two most frequent
themes were seen in three excerpts from three participants. All of the other themes were
shared by only two participants or less. Those themes, summarized in Appendix D, are
as follows:
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Change the acquisition workforce culture
Apply the initiative to the processes that support Evolutionary Acquisition
Training and education
Expectation management with the warfighters and Air Staff, and in turn
Congress
Stop smacking people’s hands for doing acquisitions differently than it has
always been done
Corporate buy-in across oversight organizations within the Air Force and the
Department of Defense
Senior Air Force leadership buy-in
Provide examples of specific success stories
Road shows
Be specific about what constitutes “results”
Move people from oversight to execution roles
Take people out of the approval chain who are not in the decision chain
Bust roadblocks
Improve filtering down of initiatives; initiatives lose a lot of punch by the time
they get to the SPO level workers
Release a new set of initiatives on a more practical and specific level
Obtain feedback from the troops
Look at how we make acquisitions work in the future
Include demonstration of initiative implementation as part of appraisals
Send out messages about when programs and people failed, but were still
rewarded for trying and being innovative
Set a standard or cut-off point where failing programs are turned off
Get people willing to take risks
Obtain buy-in from functional and operational communities
Follow through

Organization Implementation of the Initiative.
After stating what they thought would be the next steps to take in order to get
people to accomplish the goals of the initiative, participants were asked how their
organizations were implementing the initiative. The themes from the data describing
organizational use of the initiative are listed below. The most frequent theme
incorporates seven excerpts from five participants who are members of various
Acquisition Center of Excellence (ACE) offices; the second most frequent theme was
from seven excerpts among three participants; and the third most frequently occurring
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theme was shared by four excerpts from four participants. Most of the themes that
emerged were only common among one or two participants. See Appendix D for a
summary of descriptive statistics for each theme.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

ACE offices assist programs to challenge burdensome processes and try to
influence people to use the philosophy of the initiative
Stress full participation of Integrated Product Teams (IPTs) and ensure IPTs
include the warfighters, contractors, and contracting officers
Rewrote Air Force Instructions and Air Force Federal Acquisition Regulation
Supplements and other guiding documents to free up people
Negative replies about not using the initiative
Opportunity management; being proactive versus reactive, being creative, and
using risk management
Challenged SPO members to use common sense, and then if it is not the law
and does not make sense to break it
Ensured Requests for Proposals and proposals are outcome based
Developed and implemented training on using the initiative
Applied initiative as appropriate to SPO programs
Used internal teamwork to change SPO mindset from no unless you can prove
yes, to yes until a roadblock is found that says it cannot be done
Empowered SPO program leads, lessened emphasis on functional leads;
removed non value-added parts of the chain of command

Most participants indicated they were implementing the initiative in some way,
but several said they were not. Most notably, several middle management participants
said they were not actively implementing the initiative because from their perspectives
Air Force Materiel Command is now more process oriented than product oriented. They
are even being sent to lecture series and workshops by Michael Hammer on how to
specifically use and reengineer processes with the idea, as some participants noted, that
by so doing they will later be able to focus on the results. Hammer is a New York Times
bestselling author, credited with creating the concepts of reengineering and process
enterprise (Hammer, 2001:i). Another participant stated that they would not remove non
value-added acquisition processes because they would not challenge the Federal
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Acquisition Regulation without a lawyer. And one other participant said they were
having difficulty implementing the initiative.
Participants’ Roles in the Development or Implementation of the Initiative.
Not only were participants asked how their organizations were implementing the
initiative, each participant was asked what his or her specific role was in either the
development or implementation of the initiative. The most recurring theme was that
participants acted as enablers for their teams. Those enabling activities included but were
not limited to the following: challenging their teams to use the initiative; running
interference for their teams when their attempts to implement the initiative met
resistance; massaging relationships (i.e., developing and maintaining a good working
relationship) with people involved with the acquisition processes to which they were
trying to apply the initiative and making sure things were running smoothly. The theme
of being an enabler was formed from fourteen excerpts among eight participants. All
other themes came from three excerpts from three participants or less. The themes, also
summarized in Appendix D, are listed below.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Being an enabler for your team
Developer or author of the initiative
Endorser and advocate of the initiative
Had no role in the development of the initiative
Provide advice to senior leadership on ways to implement the initiative
Helped rewrite policies as a result of using the initiative
Provided training for SPOs on how to use the initiative
Managed customer expectations
Architect for implementation of the initiative within a SPO

Support for Organizational Implementation of Initiative.
After participants were asked about their roles in the development and
implementation of the initiative, they were asked several questions about the level of

54

support they are receiving in their attempts to implement the initiative. The first of these
questions asked what kind of support participants’ organizations were getting as they try
to use the initiative. The most recurring theme that was seen in responses to this question
came from eighteen excerpts given by thirteen participants. The other themes were
expressed in three excerpts among three participants or less. The themes about types of
organizational support are listed below in descending order of frequency of occurrence.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Top down support
ACE help in planning for program events
Contractor support
Initiative training; risk management training and Discovery Map training
Being left alone and trusted to go implement the initiative is the best support
Internal support
Congressional language can be a big supporter

However, several negative themes about the level of support organizations were receiving
arose from the responses of seven participants.
•
•
•
•

No support is being given
The bureaucracy is fighting implementation of the initiative
Senior leaders empowered the workforce to go out and implement the
initiative, but they are not preaching it enough themselves; need strong,
consistent advocacy
Headquarters puts the initiatives out but does not have to live with them

Appendix D summarizes both the positive and negative themes raised in responses to this
question.
Support for Individual Implementation of Initiative.
The next support related question dealt with whether or not they felt they were
getting the support they needed to implement the initiative. Over sixty five percent of the
participants said they were receiving the support they needed to implement the initiative
from those within their chain of command and from those areas within their control.
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However, thirty percent of participants said they were not getting the support they needed
from those who are outside of their chain of command but can still influence their ability
to implement the initiative. Five percent of participants were undecided. Participants
noted that they were not getting support from Headquarters Air Force (HQ USAF), Air
Staff, or the Office of the Secretary of Defense. They cited the need to have a constant
push from senior Air Force leaders in order to implement the initiative. For example, one
participant said:
… where I don't have the support is the stuff that the senior people need to do,
they aren't doing enough. I mean, they -- they just -- they -- they're distracted by
day to day tactical problems of running the Air Force to the point where -- where
if they have some time, they'll do transformation stuff, but they -- I -- I just get the
sense that they don't get that without them involved on a -- on a almost daily
basis, the -- the -- the forces against change just are so strong that they'll -- they
figure they can wait it out.
While another participant noted what senior leaders could ideally do to provide support:
… in my ideal world, Chief of Staff of the Air Force would -- would, you know,
come out and once a month, he'd have some speech on why performance based
contracting or results based acquisition is critical to the success of the Air Force.
And every time an issue came up that dealt with contractors or acquisition, we'd
have a consistent message on that.
The need for consistent, repeatedly vocal support from senior Air Force leaders and the
need for buy-in from people and processes outside of the immediate Air Force chain of
command that can still heavily impact people’s successful implementation of the
initiative continue to be recurring themes.
Organizational Support for Individual Implementation of Initiative.
Participants were also asked how their organizations were supporting them in
their attempts to put the initiative into action. The theme of support and encouragement
being provided by leadership within participants’ direct chains of command was noted
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among twelve excerpts from eleven out of twenty three participants. Three other
participants, including two middle management members, said they received support
from their organizations by being trusted to do the job and being left alone to do it. Three
excerpts from one participant called out strong support from the ACE offices as an
avenue of organizational support. Another participant said they were getting support
from their organization by virtue of having no kick-back from SPO members which
indicated that the SPO members have accepted the challenge for their organization to
implement the initiative. The final theme that arose out of excerpts for this question was
from a participant who twice stated that they were not seeing leaders at the Senior
Executive Service (SES) and General Officer level engage enough in the drive to use this
initiative; the participant considers leaders’ involvement to be one of the most important
tools they need to do their job. See Appendix D for a summary of descriptive statistics
for each theme.
Initiative Implementation Success Stories.
After participants were asked about the level of support they were receiving in
their attempts to utilize the initiative, they were asked if they had heard of any success
stories or failures at using the initiative. Ten of the twenty three participants said they
could cite no specific examples of success stories, but eleven other participants did
provide examples of what they considered to be successes. The success stories were
grouped into two categories: process level successes and program level successes.
Process level successes are examples of ways the initiative of interest has been
used to remove non value-added processes and which can be repeated within program
offices across the entire Air Force. One such example, as noted by one participant, was
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the addition of a source selection plan into a System Acquisition Management Plan in
order to get approval for both at the same time. Another participant discussed the
incorporation of a Price Competition Memo (PCM) in a Proposal Analysis Report (PAR)
which reduced time because now the same pricing structure can be used for both the PAR
and PCM.
In another process level success story, a participant was trying to purchase
desktop computers and related software to be used in an Air Force office and was told
through their contracting approval chain that the base lawyers said a Mission Need
Statement (MNS) and Operational Requirements Document (ORD) would be needed due
to the dollar threshold of the computer purchase. The participant’s office challenged the
requirement for the MNS and ORD because it did not make sense since the purchase was
just for office computers. Their challenge was successful and the requirement for the
MNS and ORD was done away with. That challenge process took about three days and
saved them six months of work had they been required to do the MNS and ORD.
Another example of putting the initiative to work involved a reduction in training
approval time. An office was taking thirty to forty days to get training classes for their
acquisition workforce. The process was examined and it was discovered that training
notifications were being held up significantly by base training officers who were not
directly involved in approving the training, but who merely wanted feedback to track who
was going to training. As a result, the process was changed by removing the non valueadded steps and base training officers now get feedback on people who attend training on
the back end (i.e., after the approvals have been made they receive computerized tracking
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information at the same time people are notified of their training approval), and training
notifications are computerized and now have a twenty four hour turnaround.
Additionally, a participant stated that the delegation of contract approval authority
down to various base level personnel, so that people now rarely have to go through the
headquarters for contracting (i.e., SAF/AQ and SAF/AQC), is also an initiative
implementation success story. Non value-added steps were removed and people not
essential to the approval process were removed from the decision chain of command.
In addition to process level success stories, several weapon system programs were
recognized by participants as examples of how the initiative can be utilized successfully.
One such program is the Crystal Modification Program. The organization running that
program was able to go and influence the Army and Navy to combine functionalities of
boxes where it made sense to do so and reduce the footprint, and, in turn, reduce the
development costs and infrastructure costs. The focus remained on the product and non
value-added steps were eliminated. According to participants, reducing the footprint of
the cryptographic systems required across the Department of Defense (DoD) is a success
story that saves the DoD money and gets capabilities met more effectively and more
efficiently.
Several other programs were also identified as success stories because of how
they kept their focus on the results being delivered to the warfighters and how they did
not get bogged down in the acquisition process itself. Programs like Global Hawk, Micro
Impulse Radar, Patient Support Pallet, and the weaponization of Predator are additional
examples that participants considered success stories of how the initiative of interest can
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be used. However, one final program was considered to be a story both of success and of
failure, namely the ChemSentry Chemical Detector program.
One hundred ChemSentry Chemical Detectors were purchased as CommercialOff-the-Shelf equipment in January 2003. According to participants, this buy was made
to support warfighters in Operation Iraqi Freedom and was called the “best of agile
acquisition” by the Aeronautical Systems Center Acquisition Executive. Many of the
traditional contracting processes and testing procedures were streamlined to get the
product out to the field quickly. The chemical detectors put out in the field were not
completely tested, but they were fielded very quickly to meet an urgent need and they did
give some level of protection (better than essentially no protection at all). Several
interview participants considered this to be a success story in the sense that the program
was able to get an increased level of protection in the hands of the warfighters out in the
field. Prior to fielding the detectors, troops were using chickens to detect chemical and
biological warfare; during air attacks chickens were put outside to see if they died or not
to tell troops if a deadly agent was present. This was one more example of a program
level success story of initiative implementation. In contrast, the follow-on ChemSentry
buy was considered to be a failure at using the initiative.
Initiative Implementation Failures.
Forty three percent of interview participants indicated that they had not heard of
any specific examples of failure at using the initiative, though several did identify
program level and process level failures. As noted above, however, some participants
said the ChemSentry program failed in its attempts to use the initiative during the followon buy of one hundred additional chemical detectors when agencies outside of the Air
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Force became involved. When the Army, who managed the chemical detectors
previously used by the Air Force, became aware of the new ChemSentry purchase and
fielding they performed an independent assessment of available chemical detectors and
recommended that the old type of chemical detector be used to fill the Air Force
requirements instead. Due to the Army’s involvement, and subsequently that of the
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), additional testing of the detectors was
required, the program was forced to go through the burdensome and lengthy steps of the
traditional acquisitions process, and leadership became risk averse and did not support
the use of the initiative. The participants said the program is now likely to be
discontinued.
In addition to the ChemSentry Chemical Detector program, two other programs
were said to have failed at implementing the initiative. Two middle management
members interviewed noted that the F/A-22 aircraft program was an example of a failed
attempt to use the initiative. And another participant described the increase in manpower
requirements by the Program Executive Officer (PEO) offices, recently relocated to the
Air Force Materiel Command Product Centers, over their previous manpower levels used
while located at the Pentagon as a failure at implementing the initiative of interest.
Failures at using the initiative were also discussed at the process level.
Examples of process level failures at initiative utilization were noted by two
participants. One participant discussed how the Air Force’s process for reprogramming
funds, which allows money to be used for programs other than what it was originally
slated for, does not enact the initiative. The impression among the Air Force workforce
is that Congress is why it takes too long to approve reprogramming. The participant’s
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office checked and found out that Congress only takes thirty of the hundred and
fifty-eight day cycle to reprogram funding; the rest is taken up by the Air Force. So if
money has to be reprogrammed above certain approval thresholds, it takes an average of
a hundred and thirty days just to process the request through the Pentagon.
The other process level failure example involved an attempt to do a zero baseline
of all work in a SPO at Electronic Systems Center. This exercise was originally designed
to challenge the value-added contribution of every activity that the program office was
doing by forcing each activity and report to justify its contribution. SPO personnel were
not interested in doing it. This was clearly a failure at implementing the initiative. After
participants were asked about successes and failures at using the initiative of interest,
they were asked questions about acquisition reform initiatives in general.
Being Successful at Implementing Any Acquisition Reform Initiative.
The last two interview questions were applicable to acquisition reform initiatives
on a broader scale. The first of these two questions asked participants what they think it
takes to be successful at utilizing any acquisition reform initiative. A range of themes
emerged from their responses. The most frequently occurring theme was seen among
eleven interview excerpts from seven participants. The second most frequent theme
came from seven excerpts among seven participants. The third most frequent theme was
common among five excerpts from five participants. And the fourth most common
theme was from six excerpts among four participants. The remaining themes arose from
four excerpts among three participants or less. All of the themes about what it takes to
make any acquisition reform initiative successful are summarized in Appendix D, and
listed below in order of decreasing frequency of occurrence.
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Consistent message from the top
Senior leadership buy-in; support and advocacy for initiative from senior
leaders
Be very specific in what the initiative says and in what is expected of those
who use it
Behavior of leaders has to reinforce philosophy behind the initiative
It takes time to successfully implement an initiative
Non-acquisition perspective; initiative should be written for a broad audience
and by individuals with more than just an acquisition background
Equip people to use the initiative; teach people about the initiative, train them
to use it, provide them with the resources to implement it
Buy-in from middle management (i.e., GM/GS-15s, Senior Executive Service
members, System Program Directors, Center Commanders, and PEO level
leadership)
Marketing; show people in the acquisition trenches how the initiative will
make their jobs better, more effective and efficient, and how it will help the
warfighters
Buy-in from people in the acquisition trenches and their desire to succeed
More than just support; teams have to be pushed to change
Teamwork
Hold people accountable
Focus on changing the acquisition culture
Downplay buzzwords like “acquisition reform;” those words are overused and
people outside of Product Centers think they do not apply to them
Ingenuity because one size initiative does not fit all programs
Trust of leadership
Leadership from program managers not functional leads
Freedom to use common sense
Empowerment
Reality based acquisitions management
Enthusiasm
Buy-in from operational leadership
Communication

Important Elements of an Acquisition Reform Initiative.
Lastly, after interview participants were asked about what they considered to be
the keys to successful initiative implementation, they were asked what was important to
them in any acquisition reform initiative. Many of the themes that emerged from the data
mirrored the characteristics of good metrics found within literature. The most recurring
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theme was from six interview excerpts among five participants. The next three most
recurring themes were each common among four excerpts from four participants. The
other themes produced came from five excerpts from three participants or less. Each
theme about what is important in an initiative is summarized in Appendix D, and listed
below in order of decreasing frequency of occurrence.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Focus on the mission of the Air Force and getting something to the
warfighters
Be beneficial to the acquisition grunts and the end users
Makes sense
Follow through; see it through to the end
Do not make initiatives just so they are easy to measure, they should be useful
Knowing the motive behind the initiative; seeing how it fits into the big
picture
Expectations management
Improves performance
Clearly defined; it is communicated well with examples
Buy-in for it from all levels
Leadership and advocacy for the initiative
Frees people up to innovate
Understandable
Provides specific plan
Cannot be restrictive
Culture changing
Does not lose what is good about current efforts
Attacks other than on the margin (i.e., it attacks funding stability,
requirements stability, expectations management)

Summary
After the interview data were carefully examined using methods modeled after
Creswell (2003:142-146,196) and Isabella (1990:7-41), excerpts from participants’
responses that represented the core of their answers to each question were grouped by the
themes that emerged. Appendix D visually summarizes the details about each theme that
this chapter describes; it captures all of the recurrent themes that emerged from the data
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during the qualitative analysis, the total number of excerpts that represented each
corresponding theme, the total number of interview participants who provided the
excerpts, and the percentage of participants who discussed each theme. Those themes
revealed participants’ opinions about the kinds of metrics they would use to measure the
“Focus on results, not process” initiative’s success, the meaning and goals of the
initiative, the next step in achieving the initiative’s goals, how they heard about it, the
kind of support initiative implementation is receiving, successes and failures at initiative
utilization, and how to make generic initiatives successful. Now the data analysis will be
combined with the steps to create metrics and attributes of good metrics from the
literature and applied to the initiative of interest to draw conclusions and make
recommendations for further action.
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations

This chapter presents conclusions drawn from the data analysis and makes
implementable recommendations to help the sponsor of this research and the acquisition
community more effectively utilize the initiative of interest. This research has attempted
to help senior Air Force leaders know how well the “Focus on results, not process”
initiative is working and build a framework for developing measures of success for
corporate level Air Force acquisition initiatives. That metrics framework was built by
reviewing literature and distilling the steps involved in creating metrics down into three
universal steps and the attributes of good metrics into a core set of attributes, by
performing a qualitative data analysis on interview data gathered from acquisition
practitioners, and by then applying those elements to the initiative of interest as a case
study and recommending metrics for the initiative as a result. The following sections
discuss the conclusions and recommendations reached through this research, and describe
the steps involved in the follow-on quantitative phase of the research.

Conclusions
Five conclusions were drawn from the interview data. A breakdown in
communication about what the initiative meant occurred throughout the acquisition
workforce; no consistent definition for the initiative was found among participants except
among the participants who helped author the initiative and those who work in ACE
offices. Next, it was determined that disconnects exist between the middle management
level and the other management levels on several fronts. Middle management shared a
unanimous view on what the initiative was intended to accomplish, but that view differed
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from the view that senior leaders and SPO level workers shared. Middle management
also did not appear to see the connection between the initiative and the Agile Acquisition
concept that both senior leaders and SPO level workers did. As discussed in detail later,
the relationship between middle management’s disconnects with the other management
levels may be due in part to some bias towards the initiative originator. Another
conclusion is that participants perceive that administrative hurdles to implementing the
initiative are being put up by organizations and agencies outside of participants’ chains of
command. It was also concluded that there are differing perceptions about to whom the
initiative applies. Lastly, it was noted that the use of the initiative may not be the best
way to bring about the desired changes. The following sections provide a more in depth
description of the conclusions reached through this research.
Breakdown in Communication of Initiative Definition.
The first conclusion reached through the data analysis is that there was a
breakdown in communication of what the “Focus on results, not process” initiative
meant. No consistent definition for the initiative was presented by the participants except
by those participants who helped write the initiative and those who work in ACE offices
helping other organizations implement the initiative (New Acquisition Center Provides
Warfighting Capabilities, 2001; Lightning Bolts, 2004). Many people took the initiative
to mean that if the acquisition process in question was not a law, then break it. But,
according authors of the initiative, what was intended was for people to look at the non
value-added processes and challenge the ones that do not make sense, and make a case
for why a process should not be used and get a waiver for it. The processes were not
meant to be ignored, but neither were they meant to be stumbling blocks along the way to
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providing a capability to the end customer. One participant who works closely with the
implementation of this initiative through their work with the Acquisition Center of
Excellence (ACE) offices summed it up well when she said:
“… they [the 2002 Lightning Bolt initiatives] were deployed but there wasn’t a
fanfare, a marketing campaign – there wasn’t enough communication with the
field on what was really meant by it. And so, what happened was, I think people
made their own interpretations as what was meant by it and so one of the
consequences was that some people said, hey, discipline goes out, all I have to say
is I want to do this in the spirit of transformation the spirit of vague acquisition I
should be able to do it, right? Well, that isn’t necessarily true. You still have to
provide reasons why you want to do something and that make sense consistent
with the regulations and laws that we have. You usually can waive things but you
can’t just waive them without having a reason to waive them. You still have to
make your case and you don’t have to have a stack of papers this high to make a
case but you still have to make case. So probably you may want to skip that step,
it’s like, I just want to do it so I should be allowed to do it, right? Well, no you
should make a case for it.”
Disconnects Between Management Levels.
A second conclusion, related to the first, is that there is a disconnect between what
both senior Air Force leaders and SPO level workers think the initiative was meant to
accomplish and what the middle management level leadership thinks. The people at the
senior leader and the SPO worker ends of the management chain seem to have a clearer
understanding of what the Lightning Bolt was supposed to mean and think that getting rid
of the non value-added processes is a good thing. For example, senior leaders provided
guidance on how to apply the initiative and on what the initiative means in the form of
policy letters, directives, and briefings (Department of the Air Force, 4 February 2003;
Department of the Air Force, 10 July 2003; Senate Armed Services Committee, 2002).
In addition, SPO level workers provided numerous examples of success stories at
implementing the initiative within their program offices, showing a clear understanding
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of the initiative and active use of it. However, middle management thinks the initiative is
a “dead horse,” as several middle management participants called it, and they think that
the Air Force is not even really pursuing the “Focus on results, not process” philosophy.
Many of them cited the Hammer training that they are being required to attend which
tells them that process is everything and that the results will follow, and so this initiative
is counter to the training they are receiving. The majority of middle management
participants interviewed shared this view, though that is not to say that they all thought
the approach they perceived the Air Force to be taking (i.e., process focused versus
results focused) was the right one.
The disconnect between management levels may be partially due to some bias the
middle management appears to have towards the originator of the Lightning Bolt
initiatives. This is visible in some of the participants’ comments. For instance one
middle management member said “this initiative really didn't do anything to me, but to be
honest with ya', I thought it was a parroting of something that Mrs. Druyun heard out of
the Chief's mouth...” Another middle management commented, “I'll tell you, you know
the tension between, and tension is a very kind term, between Dr. Sambur and Darlene
Druyun, you know, I -- I can't imagine there being any way that he would fully embrace,
you know, the things that you left behind… Darlene is gone, Darlene's policies are
gone.” And a third middle management member who was interviewed said “my honest
opinion is I'm not sure it [the initiative] means much of anything, to tell you the truth, I
mean, when Mrs. Druyun came up with the last set of Lightning Bolts, she was just
lookin' -- I mean, it's more of a -- of a -- it's more of a buzz word to me than anything,
you know, ‘Focus on Results, Not Process’.”
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In addition, middle management does not seem to see any connection between the
Lightning Bolt initiative and the Agile Acquisition philosophy. One middle management
participant put it this way:
“But, you know, Agile Acquisition is good. Get the bureaucracy out of the way,
that's the -- that starts the -- you know, the policy stream of Dr. Sambur. Better
systems engineering, incentivizing systems engineering, expectations
management, realistic cost estimates. All those things are -- you know, are now
the objectives of, you know, whatever we want to call it, reformation,
transformation, re-engineering… What you don't hear, you know, focus on
results, not process. That -- that's still a good concept, but it's not what people are
thinking or saying.”
The initiative of interest was meant to serve as one of the tools to help accomplish Agile
Acquisition (Department of the Air Force, 4 February 2003). The initiative and Agile
Acquisition have the same goals of improving the speed and credibility of the acquisition
community, and people are expected to tradeoff non-critical program elements (i.e., get
rid of non value-added processes) as part of Agile Acquisition which is also what the
initiative was meant to drive (Department of the Air Force, 4 February 2003).
Administrative Obstacles to Initiative Implementation from Outside Agencies.
Another conclusion is that several administrative obstacles to successfully
implementing the initiative exist. Participants clearly stated that they are getting the
support they need from their immediate bosses, but that there are obstacles from outside
organizations and agencies; for example, added oversight from Congress, having to work
with the Department of Defense and other services, and having to get approvals from
people outside of their decision chain of command. Thirty percent of participants stated
that those outside their chain of command, who can still influence their level of success at
implementing the initiative, are not providing the support participants need. Numerous
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participants also included the Office of the Secretary Of Defense (OSD) among their
biggest perceived roadblocks. For example, one former PEO said they agreed
“absolutely, one hundred percent” with other participants that OSD is one of the main
places they start hitting roadblocks. The ChemSentry program follow-on buy of
chemical testers, discussed previously in chapter four, was cited as an example of OSD’s
counterproductive involvements.
Differing Perceptions About Who is to Implement the Initiative.
In addition to there being roadblocks to implementing the initiative, people
outside of the acquisition community do not think the initiative applies to them.
According to some participants, the dubbing of the initiative as an acquisition reform
initiative led people within the requirements arena (e.g., Air Combat Command), people
in the testing community, and those in the logistics and weapon system sustainment
community to think the initiative was only geared towards weapon system acquisition
offices. The negative responses from many of the people approached to participate in
this research cited the point that they did not think the initiative applied to them as the
reason they could not help with this research; Test and Evaluation Centers, Air Logistics
Centers, and an Air Force Space Command System Program Office (SPO) did not
participate in this research for that reason.
Initiative May Not Be Most Effective Way to Bring About Desired Changes.
The last conclusion made from the data analysis is that using an initiative like this
may not be the most effective way to accomplish the desired behavioral change. Just
sending out an initiative and leaving it up to the workers in the acquisition trenches to
figure out how to apply it will not cut it. The need for leadership and people’s fears of
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change and failure need to be addressed. Participants, including the middle management
personnel, consistently said that senior leaders need to be more engaged and regularly
vocal about the importance of things like the initiative for it to be successful. After
conclusions were reached, recommendations were developed using both the data analysis
and literature review findings.

Implementable Recommendations
Several implementable recommendations are presented in the following sections.
The first recommendation was developed by applying the framework for developing
metrics that this research has produced to the “Focus on results, not process” initiative.
As previously discussed, five categories of metrics are suggested for the initiative,
specifically schedule, customer satisfaction, cost, credibility, and performance. The first
recommendation of this research will only address the metric category of customer
satisfaction because the categories of schedule, cost, credibility, and performance have
been previously addressed by other Air Force agencies and because cost, schedule, and
performance metrics are already broadly used across the Air Force. The
recommendations of this research attempt to focus on areas that will be of the most
interest and utility to the research sponsor and to the Air Force.
Customer Satisfaction Metrics to Measure Initiative Success.
This research recommends the use of customer satisfaction metrics to measure the
success of the “Focus on results, not process” initiative. Customer satisfaction is the key
to organizational success (Gibson and others, 2003:238). No matter how precisely a
schedule is maintained, how much cost savings are realized, how credible the end

72

customer thinks the acquisition community is, or what exceptional performance a weapon
system or process has, if the customer is not satisfied with the result, the acquisition
community has failed. Customer satisfaction is described as the extent to which a
process or product meets a customer’s expectations (Kotler and Armstrong, 2001:9;
Naumann and Jackson, 1999:71; Zeithaml and Bitner, 2006:75). The dimensions of
customer satisfaction can be applied across the other categories of metrics (e.g., schedule,
credibility, and performance) to suggest metrics for the initiative. It should be noted that
multiple customer satisfaction metrics could apply and one size does not fit all (INCOSE,
1998:9); the following are examples that apply, but future research could provide
additional customer satisfaction metrics. A customer satisfaction metric that applies to
schedule is timeliness (Ellis and Curtis, 1995; Hayes, 1992:8). Customer satisfaction
metrics for performance are reliability and perceived quality (Ellis and Curtis, 1995;
Naumann and Jackson, 1999:72). And a customer satisfaction metric for the area of
credibility is responsiveness (Ellis and Curtis, 1995; Hayes, 1992:8; Naumann and
Jackson, 1999:72). A customer satisfaction metric for cost is not suggested because,
according to Hammer (2001:103), it tells very little if anything about the business. The
visual depiction of how the dimensions of customer satisfaction can be applied across the
metric categories of schedule, cost, performance, and credibility to produce generally
applicable customer satisfaction metrics for the initiative is displayed below as Table 6.
The list of metrics is general since the attributes of each dimension are very product
specific, meaning the metrics should be tailored for a better fit depending upon what
product or process they are applied to (Naumann and Jackson, 1999:73). One size metric
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does not fit all (INCOSE, 1998:9). The development of more specific program and
process metrics could be explored as part of future research.
Table 6. Generally Applicable Customer Satisfaction Metrics
Schedule
Performance
Credibility

Dimensions of Customer Satisfaction Metrics
Timeliness
Reliability and perceived quality
Responsiveness

In addition to suggesting metrics for the “Focus on results, not process” initiative,
this research makes several other recommendations to improve the implementation of the
initiative and future initiatives. These additional recommendations are discussed in
greater detail below. Following those recommendations are suggestions for future
research and a summary of this research.
Innovation Training for Acquisition Workforce.
The acquisition workforce needs to continue to be recruited and trained to think
outside the box and to not always follow the cookbook recipe. The workforce has
traditionally been trained in how to use the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), the
Department of Defense 5000 Series, source selection guides, and other guides and
instructions about what processes and procedures to follow, but if the acquisition
community is now expected to be innovative, not have the business as usual mindset,
think for themselves, be creative, and change how acquisitions are conducted, then they
have to be trained in how to do that. There is a need for this kind of training among the
workforce. This is evidenced by one middle management participant who was speaking
to acquisition practitioners on Lightning Bolt initiatives and a woman in the audience
said, “I used to be able to sit down at my desk and open my cookbook and follow the
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recipe and I'd get done with the product. You took my recipe book away from me and I
don't know what to do.” The objective now is not to have people open the book and
follow it step by step, but instead to think for themselves and do what is smart. But they
have to be trained how to do that. One avenue to train the acquisition community is to
train people in modern business philosophies and tactics, like strategic purchasing, the
entrepreneurial mindset, and organizational management, versus the standard government
process and procedure oriented training.
More specifically, several contracting division chiefs noted that contracting
personnel should be specifically targeted for training because they are often seen as
roadblocks. The division chiefs also stated that many contracting people are very
regimented in how they do business and if it is not specifically authorized in the Federal
Acquisition Regulation they are not willing to do it. In addition, many civilians entering
the government sector today are taught little about the military in their educations, and it
is unlikely that they will put the emphasis on the warfighter in their work if they do not
have an understanding of what the warfighter does or goes through on the battlefield.
Participants suggested that one way to sensitize government civilians, specifically those
in the contracting career field, to the warfighters’ needs is to include them in Professional
Military Education (PME) classes. This is being done to some extent already, but it
should be expanded. Participants also distinctly identified the need for personnel at the
Defense Finance and Accounting Service and the Defense Contract Management Agency
to receive PME.
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Create Functional Area Guiding Principles.
The next recommendation is that all functional areas (e.g., engineering, finance,
program management) within the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition
(SAF/AQ) office create a set of guiding principles for the people within their functional
areas in the acquisition community that would spell out what is expected of those people
as they participate in this transformation movement. The guiding principles created by
SAF/AQC for contracting personnel could act as the template for the other functional
areas. There is a need for an expectations guide; participants from the ACE offices noted
that they get numerous calls from people asking what is expected of them in this new
acquisition environment and from people asking how to do acquisition without the
cookbook. Principles like the ones SAF/AQC has included in part one of the Air Force
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Supplement (Department of the Air Force, 1 May
2003) give people an idea of what they are expected to do, how they are expected to act,
and what they are expected to accomplish.
Make Waiver Process Easier.
The next recommendation is to make the waiver process less burdensome and
faster. The initiative of interest is designed to enable acquisition practitioners to
challenge the things that do not make sense; in turn, the process used to make these
challenges needs to be addressed. It takes so much effort and time to get a waiver for
regulations, Air Force Instructions, and other required processes that you might as well
have just done the process or followed the regulation or instruction that you were trying
to change. Many participants said the current method is just too much trouble. This view
is supported by one of the General Officers interviewed who stated the following.
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“So what's important for me in an initiative is that it be something I can do and it
would be value added and it would actually cut my work. In other words, don't
tell me… I can have an exception to somethin' if I have to go ask for -- you know,
I have to go sell this exception to every layer of bureaucracy I've gotta work with.
It just doesn't -- it's -- it's just here, let me do it the regular way.”
Clarify Future Initiatives.
It is also recommended that the next set of initiatives to be sent out not use
buzzwords like acquisition or acquisition reform; rather, they should be very specific, and
metrics and a commander’s intent statement should be released along with the initiatives.
One middle management participant noted that when the term acquisition reform
initiative is used “the rest of the Air Force thinks it only applies to the acquisition world.”
Future initiatives should also be well defined and not general statements.
Numerous interview participants noted that the most recent series of Lightning Bolt
initiatives greatly differed from the previous initiative releases in that it was vague and
too general. Specificity leaves less room for ambiguity and misinterpretation. Assigning
specific goals or tasks, which in this case would be a specific initiative, has been proven
to improve performance (Latham and Locke, 1979:68-80; Latham and Yukl, 1975:824843; Locke, 1968:157; Taylor, 2001:64). Specific initiatives, in turn, will aid in the
creation of specific metrics.
It is also recommended that measures of success for the next initiatives be
established before the initiatives are released. This will help clarify what the initiatives
are trying to accomplish and what changes they are trying to bring about, and help
determine when the initiative has been accomplished.
In addition, a commander’s intent statement should accompany the initiatives. A
commander’s intent statement will give those expected to implement the initiatives some
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insight into the thinking behind them, and will allow those who implement them the
freedom to use their initiative and judgment in a manner that is consistent with the aims
of higher commanders (Department of the Air Force, 10 July 2003:2).
Create Database of Initiative Implementation Success and Failure Stories.
The next recommendation is that the Secretariat of the Air Force Acquisition
Center of Excellence (SAF/ACE) office compile a database that contains examples of
successful and failed attempts to use the “Focus on results, not process” initiative.
Multiple interview participants expressed an interest in seeing such a database created. It
would serve as a way to make the initiative of interest, which is more general and
conceptual than previous Lightning Bolt initiatives, more practical and applicable for
acquisition practitioners. Several participants suggested that it could help dispel fear and
apprehension about trying something new and failing by providing examples of programs
that failed at using the initiatives, but were still rewarded for being innovative and for
trying. The success and failure examples presented in this research can serve as the
starting point for the database.
It is suggested that a link to the database be posted on the SAF/ACE internet
homepage. And the inclusion of a feature story in Agile Acquisition: The Air Force
Acquisition Newsletter on one of the successes or failures should be considered, with the
monthly stories alternating between failure and success.
ACE Office Road Shows.
If they are not already doing so, it is also recommended that the SAF/ACE office
coordinate with the Center ACE offices to present road shows specifically focused on the
initiatives they are overseeing, like the initiative this research is focusing on, at bases

78

throughout the Air Force. Road shows could be the avenue by which the ACE offices
clearly convey the intent behind the initiatives and explain what they were meant to
accomplish. Road shows would be a display of leadership’s support for and advocacy of
the initiatives. They could be the path to train and educate people about the initiatives
and obtain feedback from the troops on initiative implementation. Additionally, they
could be a time to share stories of successful initiative utilization and stories where
people or programs were not successful.
Consistent Statement of Initiative Support from Senior Air Force Leaders.
Lastly, it is recommended that the Chief of Staff of the Air Force be asked to
include a statement of support for continued acquisition reform, stressing the importance
of compliance with acquisition initiatives in his monthly Chief’s Sight Picture newsletter.
And it is recommended that the Secretary of the Air Force be asked to make a similar
statement in his Secretary’s Vector newsletter. Such statements would address the
prevailing and pervasive request from interview participants and others for consistent,
continual, vocal support for the initiative of interest from the Chief and other senior Air
Force leaders. The Chief and the Secretary’s continued and open support would enable
those expected to implement the initiatives to really challenge the party-line way of doing
acquisitions, become innovative, and change the acquisition process.
This research has made several recommendations to better measure the success of
the initiative’s performance, and to improve its implementation and that of future
initiatives. Eight recommendations are made in total. The first is to use customer
satisfaction metrics to measure the initiative’s level of success in the areas of schedule,
credibility, and performance. The second recommendation is to continue to shift the
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focus of acquisition workforce training from the traditional process and procedures
cookbook method of doing acquisitions to innovative, business oriented training. And it
is recommended that Defense Finance and Accounting Service and Defense Contract
Management Agency civilians be included in Professional Military Education classes.
The third recommendation is that guiding principles be created by each functional lead
within SAF/AQ for those in the acquisition community within their functional areas,
using those established by SAF/AQC as a model. The fourth recommendation is to
examine the waiver process and make it more user friendly. The fifth recommendation is
clarify future initiatives; this can be done by making the initiatives very specific, sending
out metrics and a commander’s intent message with the initiatives when they are first sent
out, and not using buzzwords (e.g., acquisition reform). The sixth recommendation is to
create a database of success stories and failures at implementing the “Focus on results,
not process” initiative. The seventh recommendation is for the Acquisition Center of
Excellence (ACE) offices to hold regular road shows discussing the initiative and others.
The eighth recommendation is to ask the senior Air Force leadership to send out regular
and clear statements of support for the initiative and acquisition reform efforts. Table 7 is
a summary of the recommendations made by this research.
Table 7. Summary of Research Recommendations
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Recommendations
Customer satisfaction metrics to measure success of initiative
Innovation training for acquisition workforce
Create functional area guiding principles
Make waiver process easier
Clarify future initiatives
Create database of initiative implementation success and failure stories
ACE office road shows
Consistent statement of initiative support from senior Air Force leaders
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Future Research
In addition to drawing conclusions and making recommendations based on the
literature and data analysis, it is suggested that future studies continue the research stream
begun by this project. The future research would consist of a quantitative analysis that
would validate the findings of the qualitative research.
As part of future research, a questionnaire can be constructed using the data
gathered from the interviews. The questionnaire can be used to evaluate the generated
metrics along the dimensions of “good” metrics; specific metrics that apply to the
categories of metrics this research suggests can then be identified during future research.
A questionnaire development process is provided below.

Quantitative Data Analysis
During the second phase of the research, a panel of experts can provide an
independent assessment of whether or not the metrics suggested for the Lighting Bolt of
interest possess the characteristics of good metrics. They can use a questionnaire
constructed using the data gathered from the interviews. The questionnaire can be used
to evaluate the generated metrics along the dimensions of “good” metrics. The metrics
can be numerically ranked against the dimensions of good metrics using a seven-point
interval scale. Univariate statistics can then be used to analyze the central tendency,
dispersion, and score distributions of the resulting data.
Response Format.
A seven point scale can be used for the quantitative phase because seven point
scales are the best choice in terms of subjects being able to clearly distinguish scale
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values from one another, and the best for reliability (Cox, 1980:414; Schwarz and others,
1991:571). The rating scale for this research also consists of positive numbers because
scales being used to assess the intensity of individual attributes should be formatted from
zero-to-positive values; this stresses that the question being asked deals with the presence
or absence of the given attribute, instead of the presence of its opposite (Schwarz and
others,1991:578). It can be determined in the quantitative phase whether the survey
instrument will use rating scales tailored to fit each attribute or if it is more appropriate to
use a more universal scale for all of the attributes. These findings support using the
measurement scale described above.
Validation.
A panel of experts can be provided with a list of all the metrics suggested by the
interview data. They can then be asked to refine the list and regroup the metrics as
necessary, in order to eliminate redundancies. The panel of experts can then be asked to
quantitatively assess the refined list of metrics against the attributes of good metrics. By
completing these two tasks, the panel of experts can provide content validity for the
survey instrument developed. The survey instrument can be further validated in a followon effort that collects data from a representative sample, analyzing the responses
statistically.
Measure of Central Tendency.
The mean rating for each metric can be calculated across all the participants.
These ratings can then be ranked from highest to lowest, starting with the most important
attribute. Then the ratings can be ranked against the second most important, and so on.
The hierarchy of attribute importance can be based on the findings of the qualitative
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phase of the research. This can show how the average participant rates each metric
against the characteristics of good metrics.
But because the mean gives more weight to outliers that could skew the data, the
median score for each metric rating can also be determined to further describe the central
tendency (Dooley, 2001:321).
Measure of Dispersion.
Next, the dispersion of the data can be analyzed to determine how much the data
varies above or below the mean. In this context, this value tells how much the ratings of
this small sample differ among themselves (Kachigan, 1991:41). The standard deviation
can be calculated to describe the data dispersion because it incorporates the distance from
the mean for each observation, versus using the range which only uses the two most
extreme observations and is susceptible to skewness by outliers (Dooley, 2001:321).
If participants’ ratings vary greatly from one another, it may be an indicator that
either the metrics or attributes are ill-defined, or it could mean that there is something
unclear about the format of the questionnaire. Conversely, clustered ratings (i.e., ratings
that are closely grouped together) may support that the questionnaire is sound, and they
may provide a more accurate measurement of the quality of the metrics against the
attributes.
Score Distributions.
Then, the score distributions can be shown through rank-ordering and frequency
counts. Following Nunnally’s (1959:46) suggestion for analyzing data when the number
of subjects is small, the survey instrument score distributions will be described by rankordering. For example, if a metric has the highest score out of five metrics for the
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dimension of simplicity, it can be easily understood how simple the metric is in
comparison to the other metrics. After the central tendency and dispersion of the data are
analyzed, the metrics can be ranked to illustrate which metrics possess the highest
number of good attributes in comparison to one another.
And for a broader application, the frequency of how many times each metric is
rated as having the various attributes and how many times they were rated as not having
the attributes will be interpreted from the data. This can provide a more generalized
rating of ‘yes - a particular metric is simple, or is meaningful to the customer, or relates
to the strategic goals of the organization,’ and so on, or a generalized rating of ‘no - it is
not simple,’ etc. Analysis of the quantitative data can provide support for conclusions
reached through the qualitative phase of the research.

Discussion
This project was designed to help better understand the effectiveness of Air Force
acquisition initiatives, using the Lightning Bolt initiatives as a case study, and to establish
acquisition based measures of success. Specifically, this research focused on the
Lightning Bolt 2002 initiative that is most closely linked with the goal set for the Air
Force to improve speed and credibility: “Focus on results, not process” (Senate Armed
Services Committee, 2002). This research examined the literature to provide a historical
context for the Lightning Bolt 2002 acquisition initiatives, and to explain the importance
and composition of metrics. From the literature a three step generic process for creating
metrics and the core attributes of good metrics were identified. Next, the research
described the interview process used to collect data and the qualitative method used to
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analyze the data. Then the research explained the themes that evolved from the data and
the resulting conclusions. Finally, the research made recommendations that could be
implemented to further improve the performance of the initiative and made suggestions
for future research opportunities.
This study gives Air Force leaders clear, implementable metrics that can be used
as measures of success for the “Focus on results, not process” initiative, and provides
recommendations that can be used to improve this initiative’s performance and that of
future corporate Air Force acquisition initiatives. This study also gives Air Force leaders
insight into whether or not this initiative and others like it are an appropriate and effective
way to drive the changes they are meant to bring about. Finally, from a broader
perspective, the framework used in this study can be used to develop measures of success
for other corporate level Air Force acquisition initiatives.
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Appendix A: Interview Assistance Request Letter

23 August 2003
Colonel Rita Jordan
AFIT/EN
2950 Hobson Way
WP AFB, OH 45433-7765
Mrs. Marty Evans
Director, AF Acquisition Center of Excellence
Assistant Secretary (Acquisition)
SAF/ACE
1060 Air Force Pentagon
Washington, DC 20330-1060
Dear Mrs. Evans
Thank you for the sponsorship the Acquisition Center of Excellence (ACE) office
is providing for the thesis research of Capt Carey Petit. Col Ralph DiCicco’s help has
been immeasurable in starting her research down a path that will prove useful to the Air
Force acquisition community. I am writing to you to ask for your continued assistance
with the next step of this research.
A large portion of Capt Petit’s research requires interviewing system program
office (SPO) members at various managerial levels who have had experience with the
2002 acquisition Lightning Bolt initiative “Focus on results, not process.” Ideally,
individuals throughout the chain of command at selected SPOs within all of the Air Force
Product Centers and Air Logistics Centers would be targeted for interviews. The target
audience would ideally consist of: 40-50 people; an equal number of people to be
interviewed at each of the Product and Logistics Centers; individuals who hold varying
levels of managerial responsibility (e.g., people ranging from program managers, to
Development System Managers, to System Program Directors, and potentially all the
way to Center Commanders). The target timeframe for the interview process would
ideally be to identify the interview subjects by 30 Sep 03 and complete the interviews by
31 Oct 03.
I would like to ask for the assistance of the ACE office in identifying individuals
within this target audience who have experience with the “Focus on results, not process”
initiative. It is my understanding that the Center level ACE offices have the resources to
identify such individuals at their respective Centers. Any assistance your office or the
Center ACE offices can offer in identifying these interview subjects by name, location,
phone number, and email address would be a great help. For your convenience, a draft
letter inviting SPO members to participate in this interview process is attached for your
signature. Capt Petit would like to send the letter to the SPO members on your behalf,
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once the Center ACE offices have identified them. Your continued support of this
research effort is greatly appreciated.

If you have any questions, please contact Capt Petit by phone at (937) 252-3164
or by email at carey.petit@afit.edu. Your help in locating interview subjects who are
already familiar with the initiative will greatly facilitate the interview portion of this
research. Thank you for your help with this matter.
Sincerely

RITA A. JORDAN, Colonel, USAF
Associate Dean
Graduate School of Engineering and Management
(Thesis Committee Chair)

CAREY PETIT, Captain, USAF
Graduate School of Engineering and Management
Attachment:
Interview Invitation Letter

87

Appendix B: Interview Invitation Letter

31 October 2003

1560 Wilson Blvd.
Suite 901
Arlington, VA 22209
Potential Interview Subject
1050 Air Force Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20330-1050
Dear (Interview Participant’s Name)
Through the assistance of the Center ACE offices, you are one of a very small
group who have been identified as having experience using or knowledge of the 2002
acquisition Lightning Bolt initiative “Focus on results, not process.” As your schedule
permits, Capt Carey Petit would like to set up an appointment to interview you about
your experiences with this acquisition reform initiative. Capt Petit is a graduate student
at the Air Force Institute of Technology. Her master’s thesis research is on developing
measures of success for the “Focus on results, not process” initiative.
Capt Petit’s research will include interviews with people throughout Air Force
Materiel Command who hold positions at various managerial levels. I am personally
interested in what you, the front-line acquisition practitioners, think about these
initiatives and their appropriateness. Most importantly, this will give me the necessary
insight to make changes and improvements that help us all serve the Air Force better.
Attached is a copy of the interview questions that will be asked. However, the
interview is meant to be only partially structured to allow for the free flow of ideas that
are outside the confines of the preset interview questions and to maximize the time
available for open discussion. Information collected during the interview will be
completely confidential; no individual will be identified in any way in Capt Petit’s thesis
or related published articles. The interview questions have been approved through the
Air Force Personnel Center and assigned the official survey number of USAF SCN 03098.
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Thank you in advance for your willingness to assist Capt Petit in her research
efforts. She will be in touch with your office to set up an appointment for your interview.
If you have any questions, Capt Petit can be reached by phone at (937) 252-3164 and by
email at carey.petit@afit.edu.
Sincerely
// SIGNED//

MARTHA T. EVANS
Director
Acquisition Center of Excellence
Attachment:
Interview Question List
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Attachment: Interview Question List
1. What do you think the 2002 Lightning Bolt “Focus on results, not process” means?
2. What do you think are the results it is trying to accomplish? What are its desired
outcomes?
3. Do you think these goals are appropriate?
4. What metrics would you use to measure those results or outcomes?
5. What do you consider to be the most important aspects of the “Focus on results, not
process” acquisition reform initiative?
6. What should be the next step in “focusing on results”?
7. How did you hear about the “Focus on results, not process” initiative?
8. How is your organization implementing it?
9. What has been your role in the development and/or implementation of this initiative?
10. How would you know if you are succeeding at implementing the initiative?
11. What kind of support is your organization getting in order to implement the initiative?
12. Are you getting the support you need to implement the initiative?
13. How is your organization supporting you in your attempts to implement the initiative?
14. Have you heard of any success stories at implementing the initiative?
15. Have you heard of any big failures at implementing the initiative?
16. What do you think it takes to be successful in implementing any acquisition reform
initiative?
17. What is important to you in an acquisition reform initiative?
18. Is there anything else you would like to discuss?
19. Do you have any questions for me?
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Appendix C: Interview Related Exchanges

23 August 2003
Captain Carey Petit
AMC P.O. Box 33768
WP AFB, OH 45433
Potential Interview Subject
System Program Director, XXX Platform
XXXXX AFB, XX 00000
Dear (Interview Subject’s Name)
I want to thank you again for agreeing to assist me with my effort to develop
measures of success for the 2002 acquisition Lightning Bolt initiative “Focus on results,
not process.” I appreciate you taking time out of your busy schedule to participate in the
interview we have scheduled for 23 Sep 03 at 1300hrs. Please let me know if any
conflicts arise with the current time we have scheduled for our interview. I look forward
to talking with you.
I can be reached by phone at (937) 252-3164 and by email at carey.petit@afit.edu,
if you have any questions.
Sincerely

CAREY PETIT, Capt, USAF
AFIT Graduate Student
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Appendix C: Interview Related Exchanges
Interview Script
NOTE: Have interview subject fill out checklist below at the beginning of the interview
during the set-up time (i.e., while tape recorder is being set up and other preparations are
being made):
Demographics
Age and Gender?
Occupation
- Functional area?
Organization
- Number of organizational levels that separate you from the Center
Commander?
Supervisor
- If so, how many people do you supervise? What are their occupations?
Tenure
- Time in service?
Introduction
Good morning (afternoon), my name is Capt Carey Petit. I am a student in the
Strategic Purchasing Master’s Degree Program at the Air Force Institute of Technology
(AFIT). The information I collect through this interview will be part of my master’s
thesis. My thesis is about developing measures of success for the 2002 Lighting Bolt
initiative “Focus on results, not process.” I want to thank you for taking time out of your
busy schedule to answer a few questions for me. Your help will potentially assist the Air
Force Acquisition Center of Excellence (ACE) in establishing metrics for this initiative
and in determining if such initiatives should be continued in the future, and you will
greatly assist me in furthering my thesis work.
Confidentiality
Let me begin by saying that everything you say today will be completely
confidential. Your comments will only be seen by me, my advisor, and a transcriber.
Only general feedback on the responses of interview subjects will be used in my thesis.
No individual will be identified in any way. Any quotations that are used in my final
paper will be altered in a way to conceal your identity.
The interviews conducted during my research will be analyzed for common
themes. These common themes will then be used to help me write a questionnaire that
will assess the effectiveness of the “Focus on results, not process” initiative
implementation and the appropriateness of metrics gathered from the interview data as
future measurements of success for the same initiative. The questionnaire will potentially
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be filled out by many people throughout Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) and Air
Force Space Command (AFSPC) in future research efforts.
As I will not be able to remember everything that is said during the interview, I
will be taking notes and would like to ask your permission to record our conversation,
which will then later be transcribed. No one other than me, my advisor, and a transcriber
will read my notes or hear, or read the transcription of, the interview. At any time, you
can read my notes and correct any mistakes you think I have made. And if at anytime,
you would like to stop recording for any reason, please let me know. If you would like, I
will be glad to forward a copy of this interview to you after it is transcribed.
Interview Format
I apologize up front for watching the clock, because I do not want to take up too
much of your time. I have tried to limit my questions so as not to exceed 30-45 minutes.
However, I want to stress that the interview is meant to be somewhat unstructured and
free-flowing. So if there is anything that you would like to discuss further please let me
know. Do you have any questions before we start?
Interview Items
To give you a brief summary of the focus of my research… The President,
Secretary Rumsfeld, and other senior Air Force leaders are continuing to seek ways to
improve the Air Force’s acquisition processes through various means of acquisition
reform. A series of acquisition reform initiatives called “Lightning Bolts” were started in
1995 by Ms. Darleen Druyun, then Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
for Acquisition Management. My research will focus on the 2002 Lightning Bolts
entitled “Focus on results, not process.” This initiative drives a “clean-sheet” approach to
acquisitions by streamlining processes in order to remove non value-added steps. One
recent example of this initiative in action is the rewriting of the regulations that govern
weapon system procurement within the Department of Defense, the DoD 5000 series;
portions of the regulation were eliminated while others were rewritten.
Now, from your personal experiences, I would like you to think of acquisition reform
initiatives, specifically the 2002 Lightning Bolt initiative “Focus on results, not process.”
Think of your role in this reform effort. Also, try to recall the activities that surrounded
the initiative and of your impressions of its facilitation.
<< Pause a moment >>
OK, let’s get started…
1. What do you think the 2002 Lightning Bolt “Focus on results, not process” means?
2. What do you think are the results it is trying to accomplish? What are its desired
outcomes?
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3. Do you think these goals are appropriate?
4. What metrics would you use to measure those results or outcomes?
5. What do you consider to be the most important aspects of the “Focus on results, not
process” acquisition reform initiative?
6. What should be the next step in “focusing on results”?
7. How did you hear about the “Focus on results, not process” initiative?
8. How is your organization implementing it?
9. What has been your role in the development and/or implementation of this initiative?
10. How would you know if you are succeeding at implementing the initiative?
11. What kind of support is your organization getting in order to implement the initiative?
12. Are you getting the support you need to implement the initiative?
13. How is your organization supporting you in your attempts to implement the initiative?
14. Have you heard of any success stories at implementing the initiative?
15. Have you heard of any big failures at implementing the initiative?
16. What do you think it takes to be successful in implementing any acquisition reform
initiative?
17. What is important to you in an acquisition reform initiative?
18. Is there anything else you would like to discuss?
19. Do you have any questions for me?
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Appendix D: Summary of Interview Themes and Participant Responses

When reviewing Appendix D, be aware of the following factors: a) more than
one theme could apply to a participant’s response for any given interview question (e.g.,
Table 4 in chapter four shows how one response from a participant applied to the themes
of schedule, cost, and performance); and b) the percentage of participants among whom
the themes occurred may seem elevated due to the low number of participants who
participated in the research (e.g., one participant equals four percent of the total
participants).
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Appendix D: Summary of Interview Themes and Participant Responses (continued)
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